

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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FEATURED IN THIS ISSUE:

Reorganization and the Internal Revenue Service, by Clara Penniman

Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan, by E. L. Sherbenou

Metropology: Folklore and Field Research, by Charles R. Adrian

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Public Administration Review

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in this number

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Reorganization and the Internal Revenue Service*

By CLARA PENNIMAN

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IN the last quarter century we have moved from prescribing a model organization form for all agency ills to a skepticism that suggests reorganization is at best a palliative, possibly shifting pressures but without necessarily changing the underlying forces. And that moreover reorganization may disrupt both informal and formal work arrangements to the detriment of the effectiveness of the organization at least in the short run. It is true that both the national Hoover Commissions and the numerous state Little Hoover Commissions freely recommended reorganization as a solvent to numbers of problems. Many administration specialists saw in these reorganization proposals old, traditional views of reform and a failure to use new knowledge that reflected grave doubts of the efficacy of reorganization as a general prescription. The subsequent years have supported much of the skepticism. On the one hand, Congressmen have refused to consider reorganizations that they believed might upset cherished relations such as the division of authority between the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. On the other hand, reorganizations enacted have produced unanticipated results for their supporters and opponents. Frank Rourke found that the apparent Presidential-labor victory in the transfer of the Employment Service-Unemployment Compensation functions to the Department of Labor was followed by a transfer of states-rights industry pressure not only to the new Department but

► In spite of empirical research and theoretical discussions questioning the value of reorganization, it does occur. One of the more interesting and significant instances was the recent reorganization of the Bureau of Internal Revenue beginning in 1952. This attempt to improve organization operation is still going on as the new Internal Revenue Service continues to try to meet the new problems that have developed and the old problems it inherited. This article describes the reorganization and examines some of the criteria for judging the success or failure of the attempt.

to Congress and action there that tended to restore the pre-reorganization status quo.¹

If reorganization is not a remedy to be widely prescribed, neither is it to be entirely rejected. The need is to understand and to describe organizational symptoms with sufficient clarity and precision to recognize when and in what respects reorganization may be the appropriate prescription. This brief description of the reorganization of the Internal Revenue Service will not settle this controversy as to the role of reorganization in reform and change, although it may contribute to the understanding of that role. The questions raised are modest: What characteristics of the organization structure of the Bureau of Internal Revenue contributed to the problems culminating in open scandals? Has the new organization structure helped to meet the old problems without raising major problems of its own?²

¹ Francis E. Rourke, "The Politics of Administrative Organization: A Case History," 19 *Journal of Politics* 461-78 (August 1957).

² On the assumption that there are innumerable possible organization structures to be paired with innumerable possible objectives (at least modifications

* Research for this study was aided by a grant from the Graduate Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin.

Bureau of Internal Revenue, Post-War

On the eve of World War II, the reputation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue stood high with the Congress and the public. The known rectitude of Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau sheltered the Bureau. And Roosevelt's Commissioner Guy Helvering had achieved for himself and the Bureau almost the imperial status of J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I. Helvering's unprecedented term (ten years of FDR's twelve, 1933-43) as Commissioner covered changes of importance—collection of taxes from the newly legalized beer and liquor industry (1933), decentralization from Washington to the field of the appellate function (1939), blanketing of all deputy collectors under civil service merit system (1942), extension of the income tax to all with incomes of \$600 or over, and (just before he left) adoption of general withholding to aid in tax collection (1943). The fact that only the deputy collectors and not the collectors were placed under the merit system and that no institutional machinery for coordination was developed among the diverse divisions of Internal Revenue either in the field or at the Washington level left problems for the future.

The Bureau was both decentralized and highly centralized, and no sense of a single administrative organization, policy, and program infused the agency. All individual income tax returns reporting net income above \$5,000 (by 1945, \$7,000) and all corporate income tax returns were sent from the collectors' offices to Washington, examined, and referred to appropriate Revenue Agents In Charge, if field audit was required. Washington alone could make many of the final decisions immediately affecting taxpayers. Separatism and independence characterized the field and Washington and relations between the field and Washington. Each of seven deputy commissioners in Washington supervised a major segment of tax administration. The Deputy Commissioner of Accounts and Collections through a staff of thirteen field supervisors attempted to coordinate the offices of sixty-four

of objectives), no attempt is made to establish whether the new organization is the best possible. See James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 176.

Collectors. The Deputy Commissioner of the Income Tax Unit coordinated the work of thirty-nine district offices with Internal Revenue Agents in Charge. The Deputy Commissioner of the Miscellaneous Tax Unit (later renamed Excise Tax Unit) and the Deputy Commissioner of the Employment Tax Unit supervised field activities that were in part located in the collectors' offices. The Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence worked through fourteen district offices headed by Special Agents. After 1939, the Deputy Commissioner of the Technical Staff (Appellate) had twelve field divisions checking thirty-five local offices.

In all, approximately 200 field officials reported to the seven deputy commissioners in Washington. There, cooperation took the form of a gentleman's regard for the proper amenities without prying or interfering. Cooperation in the field not only tended to be less in substance but also less in gentlemanly procedure. Almost no single office brought any group of field officials together. Frequently they were not in the same city. Distrust, or even disrespect for the competence of colleagues with differing responsibilities, reinforced the separatism. The sixty-four Collectors were Presidential appointees. Other field officials came under the civil service merit system. Normal career promotion lines ran in each of the specializations—collection, income tax, miscellaneous tax, employment tax, alcohol tax, intelligence, or appellate.

Weaknesses, tolerable perhaps with a pre-war 1940 tax return load of 19.2 million, proved a serious strain when the tax return load had grown to 83.8 million in 1945 and continued to grow. Almost every working adult now filed an income tax return and individual income tax returns reached 43.6 million taxable returns in 1945 in contrast to 3.9 million in 1940. The Bureau of Internal Revenue faced the peacetime adaptation of an organization developed for less than one-fourth of the new work load and a staff grown approximately two and one-fifth times. House-keeping details of handling returns, depositing money, and filing returns had assumed proportions unknown a few years before. Even the housing of additional employees stretched the already inadequate field facilities.

Appraisal and Reappraisal

With the end of the war, Bureau leaders raised their budget requests for personnel. The implication appeared that if the Congress would provide sufficient funds for more and more employees, the Bureau could wipe up the war backlog and continue operation much as usual. The Congress for fiscal years 1946 and 1947 responded generously to these requests. The Bureau added positions and in fact reached its all-time high (as of 1961) in personnel in 1947 with 57,386 net average permanent employees. The Eightieth Congress, through its appropriation committees, showed less sympathy for the Bureau's needs and more skepticism of its accomplishments. Deep budget cuts followed in fiscal years 1948 and 1949. The average number of employees dropped to 49,356 and 50,634.

Although maintaining that insufficient personnel created the greatest handicap, the Bureau on its own and at the instigation of the Treasury undertook some management studies. In October, 1946, Secretary of the Treasury Snyder launched a "Management Improvement Program." Successively there were attempts at work simplification programs in the field, employee incentive awards, and special committees on administration appointed by the Commissioner or Secretary (in particular, the so-called Wiggins Committee reporting in November, 1948). In 1948, the first "audit control study" was initiated to assist in meeting the problem of selecting only those income tax returns for audit that were likely to contain significant errors (both in the taxpayer's favor and against him). With funds made available by Congress, the Bureau hired the management firm of Cresap, McCormick and Paget in 1948, first to make a comprehensive analysis of organization and procedure in the collectors' offices and later for a similar study of the whole Bureau—both studies to include recommendations.

The first Hoover Commission in its 1948 *Report* reviewed studies undertaken by Congress and the administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and added its own broad recommendations for a complete reorganization of the Bureau for economy and efficiency, elimination of Presidential appointment of

collectors, and an increase in the rank of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.

Congressional Investigation

Bitter words and political controversy over the cut in the 1948 budget increased normal Congressional interest in Internal Revenue. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation secured the services of four distinguished public citizens who reported formally on January 27, 1948. The subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives initiated investigations by its staff in 1947 and 1948. Under a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, detailed investigations were carried on more or less continuously from 1948 into 1954. This subcommittee's most critical investigations occurred in 1951 and 1952 when Cecil R. King (Democrat of California) was chairman. Although the Senate left most of the investigating to the House, the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce (the Kefauver Committee) and John J. Williams (Delaware) through the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, pointed up difficulties in tax administration. Other committees, especially the House and Senate Appropriation Committees, exhibited critical, questioning attitudes in hearings with Internal Revenue.

The investigations by Congressional committees not only highlighted the fact of corruption in Internal Revenue but also the apparent inability of Bureau officials to identify and handle its problems. The center of criticism again and again revolved around the Office of Collector. The collectors' offices received and processed the 82.6 million (1951) tax returns. They collected most of the 50.4 billion tax dollars (1951) either initially on receipt of the return or subsequently when audit reflected additional taxes due. Although corporate returns and the larger individual income tax returns were audited by revenue agents in Washington or in the field, the bulk of the individual income tax returns were examined and audited in the collectors' offices. And there in 1951 worked more than 60 per cent of all Internal Revenue employees.

The Collector's Office Stumbling Block

The collector's office was an old one, brought into existence with the Bureau in 1862 and continuously providing patronage to the party in power. The collectors were appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. For most years until 1939, the deputy collectors in the office of the collector were appointed by the collector. (The class "deputy collector" covered most employees above the clerical level in the office so that they represented substantial patronage and control.) In 1939 appointment of the deputy collectors was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, and in 1942 the deputy collectors were brought under the merit system. Merit system coverage did not convert immediately the deputy collectors from political appointees to neutral civil servants. Temporary, war service appointments after 1942 did not guarantee political neutrality for new deputy collectors where the collector did not wish it. The collector, usually a political figure of importance in his community (as a Chicago attorney expressed it, "a man who would be regularly seen at the prize fights") might or might not be knowledgeable in the technicalities of tax administration. He might have business interests that permitted only part-time attention to the work of the collector's office. He presumably did know his way around politically and would listen sympathetically to requests for delays in tax payments or other tax problems.

Since the collector not only was a presidential appointment as was the Commissioner of Internal Revenue but also normally had the endorsement of a U. S. Senator, there were both legal and practical political questions as to the reality of supervision and control from Washington. The Bureau charts showed a line of supervision running from the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner of Accounts and Collections to the collector, with a field force of Supervisors of Accounts and Collections under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner presumably supervising and coordinating the work of the sixty-four Collectors. Evidence in Congressional hearings as well as stories in the Bureau recounted that individual collectors had thrown out district supervisors with whom they disagreed and at least one collector put through a direct call to the President when he disliked an order

of the Deputy Commissioner who was visiting his office. In other words, each collector represented an island of power that could be and was directed at times against the headquarters office of the Bureau. Management changes, including adoption of punch card machine equipment, that might conceivably reduce personnel or shift control of work, met resistance. Not only did the collector's office in its own work pose a threat to headquarters, but it created difficulties in other divisions. Enforcement work that was not translated into effective collection efforts was worse than useless. Carelessness that permitted corruption, or collusion in corruption, in the collector's office did not always remain confined.

The position of the collector barred management changes unacceptable to the collectors and prevented serious consideration of field integration. Management recommendations to consolidate field services and reduce the number of separate field operations secured little Bureau attention where almost no one wished to bring the professionally and technically qualified revenue agents, intelligence agents, and others hired under merit system procedures into the collector's office and under the collector. Under the Statutes it was impossible to eliminate the collector or to consolidate the collector's office with other functions and place anyone but the collector in charge.

Other Blocks to Management Improvement

But the collector was not the only organizational soft spot. Everywhere work loads exceeded accomplishments. Washington could program, could secure appropriations on the basis of programs outlined, but generally could neither enforce program commitments nor always learn the progress made. Field reports were often late, incomplete, and inaccurate. Statistical comparisons from the Forties to the Fifties are hazardous except in grossest terms. Washington supervision, organized within each division, faced work loads impossible to handle under the old system and did not initiate adequate new means.

Until 1951, Bureau officials met defensively the recommendations of the studies initiated internally, by the Treasury, or by the several Congressional committees, with the answer that given money and time they would work

out the problems. Reorganization proposals that would involve remodelling the old collectors' officers, eliminating patronage, reducing specialization, tightening coordination in the field, and installing thorough-going management audit and internal security controls did not fit easily the interests of many of the long-time career men in the Bureau, nor of a substantial number of Congressmen, nor of influential individuals in the American Bar Association and accounting societies. Many of the career men who were personally honest and ethical were unwilling to believe that all colleagues were not equally scrupulous. "Sure there's a bit of politics here and there, but that's the way the world works, and Congressmen, especially Senators, would be the first to complain if it didn't." Or again, "Of course the organization needs some modernization but it would be unmannerly to rock the boat, and in time changes will be made."

Only the far-reaching disclosures of 1951 convinced most of the Bureau men that corruption had become a malignant growth that required early, drastic surgery. From the time John M. Dunlap became Commissioner, the Bureau adopted a number of expedients in direct reaction to Congressional findings—including the creation in October 1951 of an Inspection Service to administer net worth questionnaires, audit personal income tax returns, and investigate charges of misconduct for Bureau employees—and "cooperated fully" in the investigation.

The Reorganization Plan

The 1951 findings had also convinced President Truman. On January 14, 1952 he submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1952 to the Congress. The actual proposal came as a surprise to most Congressmen and even to the Bureau. In four brief sections, the Plan abolished all Presidential appointments in Internal Revenue except that of the Commissioner; provided for three assistant commissioners, a maximum of twenty-five regional commissioners and seventy "other officers" to be appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury under Civil Service merit system; and transferred all functions and authority from the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the Secretary of the Treasury for redelegation as he determined.

Public hearings and debates in both the House and Senate emphasized the variety of interests involved. Supporting the Reorganization Plan were the Administration spokesmen in the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission. Citizens for the Hoover Commission Report, the American Federation of Labor, the Kiwanis International, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, and the National Civil Service League were among other groups that supported the plan. The American Bar Association Tax Committee gave their support, but the House of Delegates of the Bar reversed the Committee. No one supported corruption, but many found reasons for opposing the particular plan—some Senators for whom patronage was important, Republicans with hopes of 1952 victory who preferred to undertake their own reorganization, collectors and their friends and associates who had found the system satisfying, attorneys and accountants who did not wish to lose their knowledge of old Bureau ways, and skeptics of organization change as a solution.

The House with little discussion accepted the recommendation of its Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments and approved the President's Plan. The Senate Committee on Government Operations under McClellan, spurred on by Senator George, disapproved the Plan with Senators Humphrey, Monroney, and Moody submitting a strong minority report. The floor fight (led by Senators Humphrey and Monroney and joined by Williams of Delaware, Aiken of Vermont, and others) resulted in defeat (53-37) for Senator George and the Southern Democratic-Republican coalition and brought reversal of the Committee's recommendation.

With broad authority to reorganize, hundreds of decisions followed to bring about a new organization within the following months and to transfer the legal authority from the old to the new officials (new titles whether always new individuals or not). Ten task force committees worked to put the plans into operation by the statutory deadline of December 1, 1952. In addition a selection board was set up to recommend individuals for the seventeen regional commissioner and sixty-four district director positions to the Secretary of the Treasury for appointment. The selection proc-

ess combined factors of personal acquaintance, career experience, and open competitive examinations. With the Republican victory in the fall of 1952, efforts were made to assure that party's acceptance of the change. When the Cleveland Regional Office was opened with a public ceremony in December 1952, the newly designated Secretary of the Treasury, George M. Humphrey, sat on the platform and joined in the installation.

The Republicans Assume Command

The Eisenhower administration in January found an Internal Revenue agency reorganized but an organization just off the drawing boards, not yet tested for strength and durability. The administration named T. Coleman Andrews as the new Commissioner of Internal Revenue.³ He began with important Congressional support not only from the Republicans but from Democrats (notably Representative Vaughn J. Gary of Virginia, ranking Democratic member of the House Appropriations subcommittee handling Post Office and Treasury budgets). In an early step, Andrews appointed B. Frank White, management consultant, to review the new organization and to report to him as to its feasibility. A favorable report confirmed Andrews' view and brought only minor changes in implementation of reorganization, e.g., reduction in the number of regional offices from seventeen to nine and the placement of alcohol and tobacco tax administration in the Regional Office with no operating responsibility under the District Director. The change in number of Regional Offices from seventeen to nine enabled Andrews to make some show of dissent from the Democratic reorganization and eased some personnel adjustments he thought necessary. The original "districts" now assumed the designation "regions" and the sixty-four Collectors' offices became districts (the terms used throughout this paper). And on July 9, 1953 the Secretary of the Treasury officially changed the designation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to the Internal Revenue

Service. Although the new Republican Congress, through the subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee, pursued the question of corruption in the Bureau, the Administration in the persons of the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner Andrews accepted the reorganization from the Truman administration. Andrews, for example, asserted to the Senate Appropriations budget hearing on April 7, 1953, ". . . I do think that fundamentally the reorganization was a sound thing."

Objectives of the Reorganization

Many individuals from time to time stated their view of the objectives of reorganization and, however different the emphasis, the list included: (1) elimination of patronage and establishment of a career service; (2) improved Washington coordination and control with decentralized service to the taxpayer and adoption of administrative techniques and methods necessary to meet an increasing and changing work load; and (3) restoration of the integrity of the agency to regain administrative, Congressional, and public confidence. Objective three had a status in its own right as well as representing a hoped-for result of (1) and (2). What has happened?

The New Organization Structure

From a loose congeries of specialist divisions in the Washington office, each with its own field office, the new organization structure sought hierarchy, pyramid, and consolidation. Instead of some 200 field offices reporting directly to the Washington office, nine Regional Commissioners report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. All of the older field operating offices, except appellate and alcohol and tobacco tax, were consolidated with the sixty-four district offices. General supervisory and housekeeping functions moved from Washington to the regions. All of the functions of collection, assessment, audit, investigation, and review for most taxes levied by the United States were placed in the hands of the District Directors. Within the Internal Revenue Service, only alcohol and tobacco tax collection is administered out of the Regional office through its own field offices apart from the District Director.

The sixty-four (by 1960, sixty-one) District

³The author's collective impression of Andrews as Commissioner from numbers of interviews with Internal Revenue staff members is that he showed an understanding of management and a "brassy toughness" in the years 1953-1955 that contributed to the acceptance and strength of the new organization.

Directors report to nine Regional Commissioners who have functional specialists as Assistant Regional Commissioners (e.g., intelligence, collection, audit) responsible for advising and assisting District Directors and their staffs in the carrying out of their responsibilities under uniform policies established in Washington. In addition to alcohol and tobacco tax enforcement, the functions of appellate and of inspection in the Regional offices do not have counterparts in the District offices. Regional appellate division opens opportunities for taxpayers to have a further administrative review of their problem by individuals who have not worked on the case earlier. Inspection has responsibility for internal audit and internal security, the first to assure management control and the second to check honesty. For final control and responsibility in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the line of authority runs from the Regional Inspector to the Assistant Commissioner (Inspection) Washington to the Commissioner.

Although organization charts, as usual, tend to produce the tidy view from the air rather than the more ragged view at ground level, repeated reappraisals of the new organization have concluded that the broad line of command follows the lines of the chart and that the centrifugal factors of the past have been reduced. The District Director brings under his purview the revenue officers (formerly deputy collectors), the revenue agents, and the intelligence agents. The former walls of separation among these specialists may not have disappeared, but the thickness of the walls has diminished. Difficulties, since reorganization, arise over the practical meaning a functional and hierarchical authority. The alcohol and tobacco tax administration retains a separateness reminiscent of the old tax-by-tax structure. The three processing centers for mechanical handling of most returns and perhaps the new electronic computer center do not fit tidily into the pyramid.

Career Service

The adoption of the Reorganization Plan in 1952 formally removed the necessity for political approval of all employees in Internal Revenue except the Commissioner. The Eisenhower administration accepted and, over the

years, strengthened the career system.⁴ The Kennedy administration has continued to bring support.

From the point in 1953 when the Civil Service Commission withdrew earlier general authorization to Internal Revenue for final appointing and reclassification authority to the present there was a generally continuous improvement in career development terms. Job reclassifications both up and down, promotions, transfers, layoffs troubled the first years. A two-year experiment with a revenue agent training program at a midwest university proved mutually unsatisfactory in its original conception. Even in 1960, a House subcommittee inquiry into layoffs in the Des Moines District Office suggested ineptitude in personnel matters. Yet these and other difficulties lose importance in the broad pattern. Entry into Internal Revenue has followed merit system procedures. Emphasis on early advancement in key areas such as revenue officer and revenue agent has permitted since 1956 a normal promotion expectation from GS-5 and GS-7 to a journeyman level of GS-9 and GS-11 within three years of entry for all revenue officers and agents who meet the Service standards. Thereafter the individual secures promotion at his own rate of development.

General executive direction in Internal Revenue begins with the position of assistant district director. At this level the specialist needs to achieve a general management viewpoint. Assistant district director vacancies since 1956 have been filled by Revenue Service employees selected in national competition who have taken the six-months training in the field and in Washington under the Executive Selection and Development Program. The position of assistant district director is one of the major stepping stones to the higher management positions. In a period of five years seventy employees selected for the Program began while they were in the following position grades: 33 in grade GS-13, 24 in

⁴ A story around the Internal Revenue Service and referred to in *The Bulletin of NAIRE* (National Association of Internal Revenue Employees), October, 1955, suggests that strong pressures existed in the first years of the Eisenhower administration to shift a number of positions in Internal Revenue to "Schedule C," but that Commissioner Andrews resisted to the point of threatening to resign and announcing the reason.

GS-14, 13 in GS-15. These same employees at the end of December 1960 held position grades as follows: 1 in GS-13, 9 in GS-14, 42 in GS-15, and 18 in GS-16. The classes of 1956 and 1957 naturally showed the highest promotions. The system of selection, training, and appointment to assistant district director positions assures a supply of trained candidates for almost every top position; discourages political interference; and dramatizes to personnel in Internal Revenue the lifetime career opportunities open.⁵ Service officials in recommendations to the incoming Secretary of the Treasury in 1961 placed support of the Executive Selection and Development Program as their first priority.

Other tangible benefits have developed. The average grade level of employees has risen from GS-5.9 in 1951 to a GS-7.6 in 1960. The Service had available 157 supergrades (GS-16, -17, -18) at the end of calendar year 1960 and would have approximately thirty-three more with the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1961.

Integrity

The Congressional investigations produced a continuous barrage of adverse publicity for Internal Revenue that hurt the morale of all employees and presumably weakened the voluntary compliance of taxpayers on which the agency depends heavily for much of the enforcement of tax laws. The scandals involved varied types of problems: petty theft and embezzlement on the part of individual employees or a few combined, individual acceptance of favors in return for adjustments, acceptance of favors and the granting of adjustments by a number of individuals including personnel highly placed in the field and in Washington, a standard in collectors' offices, especially, that permitted requests for delay

⁵ Internal Revenue officials interviewed indicated that immediately following passage of the Reorganization Plan Congressmen and other individuals observed a "hands off" attitude almost as if in fear of possible association with Internal Revenue. Not all have retained this view and from time to time there are those who will recommend "deserving" candidates. The selection and training system for high promotion permits the answer to recommendations: "Have your man apply for the Executive Selection and Development Program." The political recommendation then loses force in the succession of selection steps required.

and special attention to be honored simply as a part of a local political give-and-take or at times in return for more tangible favors, and personnel appointments designed to further some of the above activities.

Removal of Presidential appointment of the collectors and consolidation of the field organization changed both the lines of control and the means to advancement in the organization. The establishment of an independent inspection service for internal audit and internal security, responsible only to the Commissioner, added to the institutional means for continuously checking the performance of field offices.

The problems of petty theft and embezzlement by individuals or employees in concert as well as individual acceptance of favors in return for a variety of "adjustments" have not been eliminated in the post-reorganization period. Just as, one might add, banks have never eliminated theft and embezzlement by their employees. Hopefully, the Inspection Service, the functional reviews, the layers of coordination discourage some employees who might be tempted and identify most of those who fail to resist temptation. The distinction between the late 1940's and today is the level at which corruption exists and its presumed absence up through the ranks of the Service. Even the uncovering of an especially large embezzlement ring involving individuals inside and outside of an Internal Revenue District office in 1959 was handled by Internal Revenue Service without interference by the administration or the Congress and without serious adverse publicity. There was confidence that the Revenue Service could and would handle the problem effectively.

Congressional attitudes and action strongly reflect a return of confidence. Appropriation requests in the last five years or so have received increasingly sympathetic attention. Public praise has been bestowed during hearings. Approved appropriations have included support for the "Blue Ribbon career service program" and the addition of supergrades. Cuts in appropriation requests by the House have been restored in whole or in part by the Senate. One group of Senators has on two occasions written to the Senate Appropriations Committee to express their support of the Service and its programs.

tions Committee requesting higher appropriations than the Administration had asked.

Productivity

Has reorganization with its concomitant tightened national office direction, improved personnel selection, and increased integrity resulted in better tax enforcement and increased tax dollars per unit of administrative effort? Logically the answer should be "yes" and in fact the answer seems to be "yes," but the evidence is fragile. Statistically one can show that with 51,206 and 51,047 employees in 1959 and 1960, total taxes collected exceeded \$79 billion and \$91 billion in contrast to 54,411 and 56,262 employees collecting approximately \$39 billion and \$51 billion in 1950 and 1951. Additional assessments in 1950 and 1951 totaled \$1,422 million and \$1,576 million, respectively (exclusive of excess profits taxes) in contrast to additional assessments of \$1,821 million and \$2,052 million in 1959 and 1960 with several thousand less employees. Although such statistical evidence is in the right direction, no one familiar with tax administration would consider these figures conclusive nor would they accept comparative figures as to the cost of collecting \$100 of revenue. (The latter comparison is frequently used in management firm reports and elsewhere, yet actually the result is conditioned probably as much by the tax rates and the economy as by the efficiency of the tax agency.) The detailed statistics that might serve more adequately to measure efficiency are considered unreliable for comparative purposes between the two periods.

The statistical "impression" of improved productivity is supported by other impressions. In the immediate pre-reorganization years, a sense of an impossible task in controlling the work load apparently permeated the organization. More recently the task has appeared more as a challenge than an "impossibility." Research efforts have been broadened and deepened not only to identify more accurately the gap between total taxes due and total taxes collected but to pinpoint the items that make up this gap. With the change in organization structure, the national office has assurance that audit, collection, intelligence, and other programs designed on the basis of this research will be put into effect

at district and regional levels or explanations will be forthcoming. The establishment of service centers with mechanical means to handle faster and more accurately many former clerical operations and the adoption of electronic data processing equipment for an eventual master file of taxpayers are opening rich avenues for programs capable of meeting work loads.

Conclusions

The organization structure of the old Bureau of Internal Revenue failed to contain many of the "centrifugal tendencies" of a large decentralized field force that Herbert Kaufman identified and found well-controlled in the Forest Service.⁶ Local influences were often more important to the collector than were national loyalty, policies, recommendations, and orders from Washington. Mutual respect through common professional training provided an *esprit* for revenue agents and intelligence agents but emphasized the separatism from the personnel in collectors' offices and in alcohol tax administration. Differing lines of promotion and, of course, political endorsement for collectors, added to the divisive forces. The organization structure emphasized differences and failed to provide a unified view of the Bureau program to the field or in Washington.

The new organization and the removal of patronage have restricted the centrifugal forces at work in Internal Revenue. A career system draws the specialists into competing for advancement in the same channels. Controls built into the new organization provide a sensitivity to field conditions that did not exist. A frankness exhibited in Management Manuals and in discussions at joint meetings of the Commissioner and his assistants with Regional Commissioners and District Directors suggests mutual respect and understanding. The Washington office places greater confidence in the field today with decentralization of most operating authority, but it exercises a vigorous leadership to maintain the reality of its confidence. But, again as Kaufman saw in the Forest Service, the victory is never finally won.

⁶ Herbert Kaufman, *The Forest Ranger, A Study in Administrative Behavior* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

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In addition, the House and Senate *Hearings and Reports* on appropriations for the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Internal Revenue Service, as well as the *Budgets* frequently included relevant material.

"It Can't Be Done"

According to the theory of aerodynamics and as may be readily demonstrated through wind tunnel experiments, the bumblebee is unable to fly. This is because the size, weight and shape of his body in relation to the total wingspread make flying impossible. But the bumblebee, being ignorant of these scientific truths, goes ahead and flies anyway—and makes a little honey every day.

—Quoted from "sign hanging in a General Motors plant" by JAMES A. CAMPBELL in *The Government Standard*, August 18, 1961, p. 2.

Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan

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WHILE the council-manager form of municipal government continues to develop and expand, the argument concerning its nature and value continues unabated. Much of the formal discussion turns about the policy role of the manager, and the participation of councilmen and citizens in the initiation and determination of policy. There is little formal discussion of the relationship of the council-manager form of government to the class system of either the particular community or the nation. The absence of such formal discussion is consistent with historic reluctance to give overt recognition to social class as a fact or as an issue. However, council-manager adoption and abandonment campaigns and elections often turn, at least covertly, about social class as an issue, and about the relationship of the council-manager plan to the class issue.

Election at large and non-partisan election are ordinarily part of the council-manager approach, and it is in terms of these devices that the lower status person is most often able to objectify his apprehension that the council-manager form means government by and for the upper classes. It is ordinarily claimed, for example, that election at large produces a higher quality councilman. The most obvious dynamic of election at large is that the candidates who are known and respected by the whole city will be of upper middle or upper class position. Without the aid of partisan organization the lower status person will be at a severe disadvantage indeed. The term "quality" has several meanings in this country.

► The city manager idea is an idea heartily accepted by most professional administrators who see in this method a sensible relationship between politics and administration. This article provides some evidence showing that the benefits of the plan are not equally apparent to members of the different social classes. It is argued that much more conscious effort must be expended to provide for the political participation of all social groups in city manager cities if the city manager plan is to continue to develop.

The Manager and Social Class

It is possible to imagine that the council-manager form could be combined with ward elections or even with partisan elections. Such concessions, however, might not calm all the fears or nullify all the resistance of the plan's opponents. It is entirely probable that the systematic rationalization of administrative structure is bewildering and offensive to many persons, and perhaps especially to those who have been least effective in securing their social, economic, and political goals. To many persons such terms as "efficiency" and "management" are associated with insensitivity to human values. The adoption of the plan is usually associated with a drive to get "politics" out of city administration. This often means that the privatization of municipal offices is to be systematically reduced, and that purely personal fiefs are to be eradicated in the interest of the community. The interests of the upper status persons are protected by civilization's laws and customs while a sentiment of ownership in a municipal job may be the extent of the lower status person's attempt to protect his interests politically. Thus the rationalization of administrative organization

may seem to injure only the poor and benefit only the wealthy.

In considering the relationship of the council-manager plan to social class it is important to remember that the plan does not create a class structure. The change from an aldermanic or commission form to a council-manager form is certainly important and significant, but as a revolution it is strictly minor. Class systems are much too deeply imbedded in the beliefs and practices of the society to be greatly modified by a relatively small change in local governmental structure. Thus if there is any causal relationship between the class system and the council-manager plan, the latter is the dependent variable.

Study Suburban Chicago Cities

The suburban cities which surround the central city in a great metropolitan area offer a special opportunity to investigate certain phases of the relationship between classes and the council-manager plan. These suburban cities are more specialized in function than cities with comparatively greater independence. Several of the suburban cities have an entirely residential function, but some have commercial and industrial development of their own. However, all the suburban cities exist in a basically dependent relationship to the great metropolitan complex. In other words, each suburban city represents a very limited part of the total system and depends upon the other cities in the metropolitan area to perform the other functions essential to a complete social, economic, or political system. The specialization of the suburb may serve to isolate variables so that we are able to compare them with other variables.

The research to be reported here is a study of the suburban cities which surround the City of Chicago. During the first phase of the study the seventy-four suburban cities nearest to Chicago in Cook, Lake, and DuPage counties which had more than 2,500 people were arranged in the order of their median dwelling unit values as reported by the Housing Census of 1950. At a later stage in the study the forty-nine suburban cities with more than 5,000 population in 1950 were divided into two groups. The council-manager cities were placed in one group and the non-manager cities in a second group. This division made it possible to compare some of the over-all

aspects of the expenditure, debt, and tax patterns in manager suburbs with the patterns in the non-manager suburban cities. It should be noted that the group of seventy-four cities and the group of forty-nine cities overlap. The forty-nine cities are merely the larger cities among the seventy-four cities.

Housing Values as a Private Measure of Class

The objective of arranging the seventy-four cities in the order of their median dwelling unit values is to compare their forms of government with a measure of socio-economic class. Precise measurement of class position may require combination of residence with other variables. W. Lloyd Warner and his associates developed measures of ethnicity, education, amount of income, source of income, dwelling area, house type, and occupation as parts of their measurement of social class.¹ However, the purposes of this project require only a general measure of the socio-economic position of each suburb, and housing values reveal the social positions of the neighborhoods in this general way.

The Chicago suburbs in Illinois describe an arc which begins on the lake shore north of the central city and continues around the city to the Indiana line on the South Side. When the seventy-four suburban cities are arranged from top to bottom according to their median dwelling unit values, the resultant pattern generally resembles the geographic pattern. With only a few exceptions the cities with very high residential values appear to the north of the central city near the lake in the area commonly known as the "North Shore." As one moves away from the lake and around to the west of the central city, the median values drop noticeably to distinctly middle class levels. River Forest on the West Side has one of the highest medians, but the other cities in the western area are definitely below the top residential values. With one or two exceptions the South Side is an area of lower median residential values.

When the seventy-four suburban cities are ranked from top to bottom according to their median housing values, a definite coincidence of high housing values and the council-man-

¹ W. Lloyd Warner, Marcia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America* (P. Smith, 1957).

ager form of municipal government becomes apparent. Council-manager governments are found in all but two of the top twenty cities. As the median value of the housing drops, a few more non-manager cities appear. About halfway down the list, manager and non-manager cities are in about the same proportion, but as we move past the middle of the scale of medians the manager cities cease to appear entirely. Oak Lawn, number forty-three on the list, is the last council-manager city. Above Oak Lawn there are twenty-nine manager cities and fourteen non-manager cities, while below Oak Lawn there are thirty-one non-manager cities and not a single manager city. The pattern is very striking. When we consider the generally close relationship between residential values and social class, the definite coincidence of the council-manager form with middle and upper class patterns is unmistakable.

Manager Adoption Pattern

The order in which the manager cities adopted the council-manager form suggests a further hypothesis. As measured by the median housing values of 1950, the council-manager plan was adopted by the top suburbs on the North Shore in 1914 and 1915. Riverside, on the West Side, but tenth in median housing value, chose the manager plan in 1925. Two more adoptions were made on the North Side in 1930 and 1931. Brookfield and Western Springs, neighbors to Riverside, adopted the plan in 1947 and 1948. From these beginnings several adoptions were made after more favorable legislation was passed by the legislature in 1951. The first interpretation suggested by this pattern is that once the council-manager plan is adopted by a city, it is more likely to be adopted by other cities in the same area. But more interesting yet, from the viewpoint of this paper, is the possibility that the plan spreads downward from the upper class suburbs into the middle class suburbs. The evidence is far from conclusive even for the Chicago area, but other suburban areas might be checked for the presence of such a relationship.

The second phase of the study involved a modification in method. The smaller cities were set aside, and only the forty-nine relatively larger suburban cities which had populations of 5,000 or more in 1950 were used.

The forty-nine cities included twenty-four council-manager cities and twenty-five non-manager cities. The manager cities and non-manager cities were then compared by computing means of several variables for each group. For example, between 1950 and 1960 the manager cities averaged 89.9 per cent population growth as compared to 76.7 per cent in the non-manager cities.²

Table 1

Comparison of Housing Values for Selected Suburban Chicago Manager and Non-Manager Cities Over 5,000 Population in 1950

	Twenty-four Manager Cities	Twenty-five Non-Manager Cities
Average of the median dwelling unit values	\$16,972	\$12,513
Median of the median dwelling unit values	\$17,809	\$12,114

Comparison of the housing values supplied by the Housing Census of 1950 for the manager and non-manager cities offers vivid evidence of the relatively affluent position of the residents of the manager cities. This comparison is set forth in Table 1. The Census Bureau lists high medians merely at \$20,000 plus. Thus an average (arithmetic mean) of the medians expresses only a part of the total difference between the housing values of the two groups. Eight of the forty-nine cities were listed as having median dwelling unit values of more than \$20 thousand. Seven of these eight employ the council-manager form of government.

Public Measures of Social Class

Expenditure for housing is primarily a private matter. Since we Americans customarily satisfy our private wants before we seek public approaches to the common good, no measure of public affluence offers the same degree of contrast between the manager and non-manager cities as does the comparison of their mean housing values. However, comparison on the basis of arithmetic means of three important variables in public finance is offered in Table 2. Table 3 supplies the ranges of the same variables for the manager cities and for the non-manager cities. In Table 2 it is made clear that on the average the manager cities

² Computed from field reports of the 1960 census.

had a higher expenditure per capita, a lower net municipal debt per capita, and higher property taxes per capita.

Table 2*

Comparison of Per Capita Average Total Expenditures, Net Municipal Debt, and Average Municipal Property Tax for Selected Suburban Chicago Manager and Non-Manager Cities Over 5,000 Population in 1957

	Twenty-four Manager Cities	Twenty-five Non-Manager Cities
Average total expenditure per capita ^b	\$68.42	\$54.24
Average net municipal debt ^c per capita	\$26.43	\$34.81
Average municipal property tax per capita	\$18.84	\$19.99

* The 1957 Census of Governments is the primary source.

^b The Census Bureau conducted several special censuses of cities in the area in 1957. Population figures for other cities were obtained by interpolation from the 1950 census and the field count reports of the 1960 census. Estimates supplied by the Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry were used as supplementary evidence in a few cases.

^c The debt figure was obtained for each city by subtracting total cash and security holdings from total debt outstanding.

A few of the council-manager cities have lower expenditure and tax patterns than the majority of the non-manager cities in the sample. These cities demonstrate that the council-manager form may be used primarily for frugal purposes. However, the general pattern is definitely toward higher expenditures, higher property taxes, and a more conservative policy toward the incurrence of debt. The major variable in this pattern is undoubtedly the greater wealth of many of the suburban cities which have chosen the council-manager plan. Recalling the strikingly higher level of the housing in many of the manager cities, we infer that they have more money. Having more money, they spend more. Proponents of the plan argue that council-management tends to develop a public confidence in the efficiency and responsibility of municipal government. Greater public confidence leads naturally to demands for an expanded program of municipal services and an increased willingness to spend by way of the municipality. Such evidence as the present study affords tends to support this argument.

Significance of Occupational Expense

The relative willingness of the middle and upper classes to try the council-manager government may be at least partly explained by their occupational experiences. Many mem-

Table 3*

Comparison of the Range of Per Capita Total Expenditures, Municipal Debt, and Property Tax for Selected Suburban Chicago Manager and Non-Manager Cities Over 5,000 Population in 1957

	Twenty-four Manager Cities	Twenty-five Non-Manager Cities
Range of total expenditure per capita	\$ 21.75 to \$167.57	\$ 28.52 to \$ 82.02
Range of municipal debt per capita	\$113.63 debt to \$115.38 surplus	\$159.05 debt to \$ 56.17 surplus
Range of property tax per capita	\$ 7.02 to \$ 70.48	\$ 7.63 to \$ 32.72

* Sources are the same as those for Table 2.

bers of these groups are executives in corporations or other business groups. Other middle and upper class persons may practice a profession or otherwise have acquaintance with professional approaches to organization. It is natural that such people find it relatively easy to visualize a professional approach to municipal administration. It should be noticed also that any particular middle or upper class suburb is more likely to exist in geographical proximity to suburbs currently using the council-manager plan. Vicarious acquaintance with the plan is thus more likely to be obtained from the neighboring cities. In many ways the upper and upper middle class groups have relatively ready access to an accurate impression of the council-manager plan. We might infer that they choose it because they know it and like it.

The counterpart of these logics is that those further down the scale lack experience in executive or professional positions and thus do not have a ready-made basis for sympathetic vision of professional public management. Also, the further down the status scale, the less likely that neighboring cities will use the council-manager form. Thus, a clear impression of the plan is geographically less available.

Planning for Citizen Participation

Proponents of the commission and mayor-council forms often claim that these forms offer relatively greater opportunities for citizen participation than does the council-manager plan. If this allegation is accurate, it seems strange that the council-manager form

should appear primarily in those Chicago suburbs most likely to be inhabited by high participation groups. It is precisely the executive, business, and professional groups that achieve the most effective political representation of their interests. Those groups ordinarily most expert at achieving their political goals evidently favor the council-manager form. The argument, then, must be that lower status persons have more opportunity for participation in the commission or mayor-council forms than they have in the council-manager form. It is easy to demonstrate that lower status persons have less opportunity to hold municipal office where election at large is employed. In addition it is entirely probable that many persons in lower status groups have relatively more difficulty understanding how they can achieve representation in the council-manager system. With these considerations the argument becomes that we should keep the mayor-council system in order to encourage participation on the part of those who have thus far been rather ineffective in achieving participation.

This situation as a whole strongly suggests that those citizen groups which have an interest in the council-manager plan especially need to study the problem of communication with those members of the community of lower social rank. Perhaps the explanation of the council-manager form by analogy to the business or industrial corporation is a short cut which is rather easily too much used. Perhaps some of the difficulties of the plan can be overcome by more deliberate planning for representation of all major groups and areas on a common slate or ticket. The circumstance in which all the council members elected at large reside in the same small cluster of houses in an upper class ward is natural.

However, it can be avoided with a little self-conscious planning. Certainly all major groups should be represented in the discussion of community goals and in the selection and development of public programs.

The council-manager plan offers no advantage or disadvantage to groups of equal political competence. The issue arises out of the political advantage which top ranking groups enjoy in our political systems. A small number of individuals and their relatives may derive satisfaction and public prominence from ward politics under the aldermanic form. But, the pattern of personal (or family) favors which ordinarily accompanies ward politics offers no realistic advantage to a group of significant size. The aura of representativeness which has sometimes emanated from such systems has often been deceptive. The distribution of personal favors, often petty, by ward leaders can have only a mild effect upon the basic power relations of our political system.

Effective political participation by large groups depends upon the development of program politics and majority coalitions of interest groups. These ingredients may be woefully lacking in our present version of a democratic system, but the council-manager plan is not to blame for this weakness. It is quite as amenable to program as any other system of representation. In fact, professional management is more likely than competitive forms to carry out such programs as are developed and selected by the community. Rationally speaking, we can certainly say that lower status groups have much to gain from the greater confidence in public instruments engendered by the elimination of personal favoritism, and by the systematic rationalization of administrative organization.

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How Much Public Relations in Government?

By DAVID M. COX

Management Consultant

JUST how important is the public relations (PR) function? Is it of equal importance in different types and kinds of organizations—industrial, business, nonprofit community services, governmental?

There exist basic factors which have a bearing on the answers to these questions. In general, the following are at least some of the factors which limit the importance of the PR function.

1. If PR is concerned with the relationships of the organization and its various more or less sharply delineated publics, then it certainly seems logical to assert that, if these publics are small both in number and in kind, the PR problems of such an organization might be said to be of limited significance.

2. If PR is concerned with the ways or manners in which these various relationships are conducted, then, if the degree of constraint inherent in a specific channel of relationships is high, the amount of permissiveness allowed must be severely limited. Thus, an organization characterized by high constraints will have little left to be done in its relationships not controlled by rule, code, or law. The PR function will be reduced directly as the constraints are increased.

3. To the degree that the function of PR is to facilitate information *inward* for purposes of policy determination and formulation, the amount and kind of information about the needs, wants, expectations, and satisfactions of the various publics of the organization will determine the significance of this function. If the amount of such information is small and the policy is itself sharply

► The public relations function may be of unequal importance in different types of organizations due to limitations resulting from the number and kind of publics, the degree of constraints on policy-making discretion, and inadequate reporting of information from the employee at the point of contact between the organization and its publics to the policy-making centers of the organization.

The public relations needs of a local unemployment compensation office are examined as a case study and show that whatever public relations problems appear are centered around the customer-employee relationship where the employee is the key figure.

constrained, i.e., predetermined, fixed, inflexible, then this function too is limited.

With certain kinds of organizations inherent limitations exist which may make the PR problems relatively insignificant. In fact, in such situations, there is little or no need for any but the most rudimentary PR. Since so little is left to PR to do in such cases, no amount of effort will make an appreciable effect on the PR of that organization.

Case Study Example

Such was found to be the case in local unemployment compensation offices in one mid-western state. Certain inherent limitations affected its PR problems. Taking up each of the factors generally stated above and examining each specifically, one finds:

1. The activities of the local unemployment compensation office are limited first by the simple fact that unemployment itself is usually restricted to a relatively small percentage of the total persons employed. There are exceptions, such as a coal mining community. Usually the total community has little awareness of the function of such an office, little need of its services, and little concern about

its existence. This is not to belittle such activities. The services performed are vital to the economy, providing, as they do, a socialization of business losses.

The services performed are few in kind, all centering around the taking of claims, their validation, and the payment of those that are acceptable within the rule of the laws governing the activity. But these services are only a small part of the total problem of an unemployed person. They are not concerned with his paramount concern: reemployment. So, his attitude toward these activities is somewhat segmented; it could be termed "peripheral." Certainly it is of minor rather than major significance.

Few activities usually means that an organization deals with relatively few sharply defined publics. Two publics do stand out in this case: the "customers" served and the employees who serve them—especially those at the counter, the so-called "point of sale."

2. Just as these activities are limited in number, discretion in carrying out the activities themselves is severely constrained. There are specific rules which govern both eligibility and amount of coverage. These are highly restricted to questions of fact, which are primarily of the "yes-or-no" variety.

All governmental type organizations are characterized by high levels of constraints. In general, it is estimated that about 85 per cent, on the average, of their activities are constrained, leaving only about 15 per cent which could be handled in a permissive manner, i.e., where PR might be significant. This is probably directly opposite to the business or industrial type organization where the percentages, on the average, may be almost the reverse. The amount of constraint is probably reflected in the organization structure which in turn affects both the number and kind of publics served.

3. Because the activities are highly constrained, the policies which govern them are simple, inflexible, and predetermined by the state central office. Further, the customers' needs, wants, expectations, and satisfactions have little bearing on the policies. The policies are more affected by the employers and unions who lobby at the legislative and central office level. Sometimes local union officers intercede for their members, but mostly this

is so much "noise" for the purpose of satisfying the member that something-is-being-done-for-him-personally. This is recognized as such by both the union official and the manager. The employer at the local level becomes involved from time-to-time, but the relationship is usually one of confirmation of facts. Neither the employer nor the union official expects or addresses the local office for a change in policy.

Public Relations Problems of Unemployment Office

Generally speaking, the PR problems of the typical local unemployment office are not too great. Certainly this is true of "normal" work loads, assuming adequate managerial skill. However, emergencies often arise in demands for service beyond the physical capabilities of the work staff and even the office space. Such emergencies create work crises—often without adequate warning—completely beyond the control of even the best of managers—but, to some extent, these fluctuations in demand can be predicted where, for example, an industry in the community is subject to seasonal demands and resorts to seasonal layoffs; economic indicators are useful in determining both the time and extent of unemployment; and, in some rare cases, industry reveals long in advance contemplated moves affecting unemployment.

Usually an unemployment peak is an emergency. This, in turn, creates an emergency problem in the local office focused most directly on the work staff. To meet the demand, temporary workers must be added who often cannot be given adequate training or supervision. But, even without these relatively poorly trained, inefficient people, the quality of the workers in a given local office inherently tends toward lower standards with time.

In other words, a saturation point is reached where no amount of additional training, no amount of additional supervision will gain results commensurate with the effort. Even efforts to increase employee motivation may be largely wasted. This is not an encouraging picture, but it is a realistic one.

The quality of the work staff may be said to tend to worsen with time as better people are either promoted or leave for other jobs. What remain are the less desirable employees who will constitute the permanent staff and will

have tenure. Even "temporaries" who exhibit rare aptitudes cannot displace the "barnacles" which become firmly affixed with protected status. Thus, adding stress of emergency peaks should intensify the drama at the point of sale. It could be assumed that this would intensify the crisis.

Unemployment Compensation Office Publics

The drama at the point of sale involves the employee and the customer. What of the latter? Any sample of the customer publics immediately reveals that it is not representative of the larger universe—the community—skewing toward lower class, lower education, lower skills, and toward the more disturbed and the more marginal people. Two major customer classifications stand out: regular, representing about two-thirds of the load who return often and the balance, intermittent applicants. The regular customers divide about equally into seasonal and marginal. Restated, the office work load divides about equally into regular seasonal, regular marginal, and intermittent customers. Naturally, the composition of the customer publics will vary from office to office and at different times of the year.

Are any of these customer groups difficult to handle? Do they create tensions and problems? Would PR help?

Generally, one would assume that people out of jobs, with installment obligations to meet or threatened with repossession would be disturbed, tense people in crisis. Such was reported to be true of the unemployed during the Depression. These are not the best elements in the population. They should be expected to be insecure, frightened, sensitive, and to tend to panic easily. They may be regressive, difficult to please, and real problems to handle.

However, from reports and study, one finds that the customers reported tend to be passive. The unemployment office drama turns out to be simply a queuing up to sign papers, etc. The situation is devoid of tension. And this is not because of special skill or training on the part of the employees, for often these people are temporaries serving in emergencies.

Relationships imply dynamics and time. When the relationship is nonrepetitive, the dynamics—the drama of the organization and its publics—at the point of sale tend to have

the character of one-act performances, almost "black-outs." Or, where the repetition is separated by fairly long intervals, there is little opportunity to establish mutual relationships. This situation is heightened where the customer brings to the counter only a peripheral interest, i.e., a small investment of himself. It is almost as if the customers have "detached" this experience from the drama of their lives and have routinized it—even with first-time appearance.

Why? It may be they wish to avoid charging it with any emotional involvement. These payments are close to relief, a dole, a form of "charity." While they may be, in fact, a kind of insurance benefit earned and paid for, the customers may not be so rational about them.

One could assume that they are quite sophisticated about these payments and that the unemployment compensation office is regarded as a kind of trading-stamp redemption office where one presents his stamp books for cash instead of merchandise. However, the fact is that there is in reality a low-key situation, certainly not one associated with a PR crisis area. Even with peak loads, there just isn't anywhere near the expected degree of tension. In sum, there is only a limited need for PR.

This conclusion is supported by a survey questionnaire of managers and supervisors conducted by a midwestern university. The role of publicity—the use of the press, sound, and picture, etc.—was found to have little or no significance in a basic PR program. Whatever needs were highlighted, centered at the point of sale.

Both the inherent limitations and the reports of passivity at the point of sale minimize the need of solution to PR problems which are largely nonexistent. The unemployment compensation office's PR problems are limited. Solutions to nonexistent problems are gratuitous.

Conclusion

In closing this paper, more discussion needs to be given to the role of the employee in PR. Where there are PR problems, they are in his hands.¹ He is the key figure in the PR situation. He is the conductor of the PR of the or-

¹ Cf. David M. Cox, "Public Relations and the Individual," 15 *Public Opinion Quarterly* 125-27 (Spring 1949).

ganization by his actions with the customer. He is also the "ear" of the organization, for he learns of the needs, wants, expectations, desires, and satisfactions of the publics served. To the extent that local policy *can* be formulated within the constraints given, such policy will be consonant with these needs, wants, expectations, desires, and satisfactions only if the employee reports are listened to and heeded.

The employee is the key figure in the PR of the organization and what he does is crucial. The manager is forced of necessity to depend on others to make or break his PR. The emphasis on the point of sale where he is normally not the principal actor means that frustration must be conquered to allow those others to perform.

Further, the point of sale is where the "visible" PR occurs. Here one can observe the publics making up their minds about the organization. Here things happen which are later talked about with others. These others may be family, friends, neighbors, or only casual acquaintances. Such remarks may be overheard—out of context and distorted—and spread on to still others as rumors or gossip. Yet this is the way people gain impressions about organizations. These so-called *minor* means of communication—personal contact, personal observation, and personal word-of-mouth publicity (rumor)—are in real fact the *major* method by which good and bad impressions of an organization are formed.

Confirmation of this concept is revealed by a little known, unpublished study made by one of the larger petroleum producing and marketing companies in the United States. After asking numerous questions and almost as an afterthought, the source of the expressed opinion of the sample was elicited. The results were, as expressed by the report, "both surprising and startling." They showed that people were not affected by the major media—print, sound, pictures, etc.—of communication. In fact, these major media accounted for more *unfavorable* than favorable impressions.

Of the favorable impressions, 94.7 per cent came from the *minor* means of communication: 77 per cent from personal contact with dealers and employees and about 17 per cent from hearsay and personal observation of what went on at the point of sale.

Comparatively, analysis of the unfavorable impressions showed 79.8 per cent from the minor means of communication with 55 per cent from customer personal contact and about 24 per cent from hearsay and personal observation.

The real job of the manager is to keep his office running on balance. His attention is drawn naturally to those areas which become or threaten to become unbalanced. Attention to imbalance then becomes something more than just solving a problem. In itself it is a means toward good PR. For good PR implies a balance in relationships with various publics. While basic constraints limit the possibility of serious imbalance in governmental organizations, awareness and attention to balance will minimize this possibility even more.

To sum up: the manager can achieve satisfactory PR with small conscious attention to its elements. A general practical guide to help him do so should highlight three points:

1. A conscious effort should be made to maintain a balanced relationship with all the publics of an organization. This is by far easiest to do where constraints are built in to prevent imbalance.
2. The point of sale should be emphasized as the locus of the PR. Here people are affected most profoundly by what is done and how it is done. Here is where the primary impressions are created which in turn are passed on to others who have *no direct* relationship with the organization: the general publics. Here is where people gain significant impressions both good and bad. Finally, here is where the emphasis will be most amenable to organized effort.
3. Because PR is a drama between the customer and the employee at the point of sale and because the customer cannot be changed or affected except by what is done by the employee, efforts made to improve the employee's behavior at the point of contact can have significant public relations results.

A Note on Methodology

For several years the writer has been concerned with the question of whether governmental organizations have the same kind of PR problems common to other types of organizations—industrial and nonprofit. In sem-

inars, lectures, and discussion groups with federal and state agencies, the view had developed that the governmental agency as contrasted with the other types of organizations: is a special type of organization with its own pattern of publics especially at the local level; has the highest built-in constraints, averaging about 85 per cent; has limited need for PR; and, where such need exists, it is predominantly a point-of-sale locus with the customer-employee axis the significant one.

When invited to participate in a two week institute of administration for unemployment compensation local offices given by a midwestern university, the author wondered about the concern with PR. Out of sixty hours, six—or 10 per cent—were devoted to PR. Independent investigation of this question was considered, but limitations of time and money and inadequacy of the sample made this impractical.

Quite by chance a research technique was developed which was a by-product of the lecture sessions. This technique has been labeled the "lecture-interview."

Rather than being based on individual questionnaires, depth interviews, etc., the method involved about sixty persons divided into three equal groups which were invited to participate in a feedback from prepared material. The lecture material was centered about two key figures in the PR syndrome: the customer and the employee.

The first group was presented with what was believed to be an accurate theoretical image of these two key figures. It was assumed that the customers were disturbed people—out of work, distressed, in crisis, even in shock. The nonverbal response from the group indicated that something was wrong. The verbal feedback indicated that reality and theory were at variance. This group was asked then to prepare a chart of their own UC office to show separate publics and the relationships.

Based on the discussion, the feedback, and the papers, a formal presentation was prepared for the second group. Exceptions, corrections, disagreements, or comments were invited as it was read. The participants were asked to interrupt by raising the hand—a check mark on the margin of the paper was made and a number assigned. Then on completion of the presentation, those individual points not answered by later parts of the paper were discussed. This group was also asked to prepare an analysis of their individual personnel and their customers.

Based on the discussion, the papers and general feedback, the formal document was re-written and presented to the last group. This time there was no disagreements. But again a paper was asked for to cover employee and customer analysis. This article is a rewrite of this last presentation.

The feedback was 1) nonverbal: reaction to material as presented; 2) verbal: questions and comments provoked by the material; and 3) written: assignments.

Judged by the frankness and the detailed critical comments of the feedbacks, the use of the lecture-interview technique with homogeneous groups in so-called institutes, which may become more and more the fashion for refresher training, may be a useful addition for research of specific areas.

In general, the following steps may serve as a point of departure for its use: background introduction; presentation of theoretical concepts to be tested; provocative material designed to evoke feedback; concepts applied to specific areas, assignments to elicit specific facts and responses covering the participants' own special home situations, and questions raised which require thoughtful consideration; and formal presentation of the feedback findings used to refine the initial concepts and to give a definition of the situation.

Cross-Cultural Training in Public Administration

By HOWARD L. WALTMAN

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SINCE 1955, Michigan State University has had an advisory group in Vietnam under a tri-partite contract with the International Cooperation Administration and the Republic of South Vietnam.¹ The terms of the contract specifically define the group's responsibility for projects in public and police administration. The public administration projects focus on developing an institution for the teaching and training of Vietnamese public administrators. Corollary activities on the public administration side of the project have included a program to study and assist in budgetary, tax, and civil service reform. The police projects have centered on the development of a national police academy and advisory activities with the Vietnamese Municipal Police Force of Saigon.

In the first two contracts under which the university operated, funds were specifically allocated for sending Vietnamese nationals to the United States for training in connection with the projects being conducted by the group. During the four years covered by the first two contracts, \$350,000 was budgeted for this activity, in addition to local currency for transportation and English language training.²

¹The I.C.A. has entered into contractual relationships with certain universities and private organizations for the performance of specific parts of the technical assistance programs.

²The dollar budget covered such items as tuition, per diem allowances, travel within the United States, and text books. The average yearly cost of keeping a trainee from abroad in the United States is about \$5,000, exclusive of international travel and language training prior to departure.

► The author takes the reader through the major steps in the process of cross-cultural training under International Cooperation Administration programs, pointing out at each step weaknesses that he believes need special attention.

These problems, he argues, show primarily the complexity of the cross-cultural training process and not that it is of questionable value. The article concludes with several recommendations for improving cross-cultural training in public administration.

During this period, approximately seventy-five Vietnamese officials were trained in the United States under Michigan State University sponsorship. For two of these four years, the author directed this program and worked closely with a large number of the grantees, from the time of their selection, through their preparations for departure, and subsequently upon their return to Vietnam. In addition, the author has worked with and observed trainees from many other countries from the perspective of the operating agencies in the United States which provide a good part of the training.³

What Is the Problem

The problem of training nationals from the developing countries of the world is a vital one. The scope of the problem, quantitatively, can be seen by noting that between July 1958 and March 1959, the I.C.A. sponsored training in the United States for 5,195 technicians and administrators from underdeveloped countries

³This aspect of my experience was achieved at the Port of New York Authority, which receives large numbers of grantees for training in almost every phase of administration.

at a total cost of over \$20,000,000.⁴ The Colombo Plan, the United Nations, university contract groups, and a score of smaller public and private organizations also sponsor trainees from developing countries. The result is thousands of technicians and administrators coming to the United States each year to improve their knowledge and skills in every area relevant to the economic, educational, and political development of a new nation.

The problem, in terms of the program objectives of our technical assistance activities, is significant in that the need to send such increasingly large numbers of foreign nationals to the United States for training reflects the critical shortage of technicians, administrators, and training facilities in the developing countries of the world. The shortage is a serious impediment to the achievement of the basic goals of our technical assistance program: to assist the economically underdeveloped nations of the world to improve their standard of living and to gain in stature as free and independent countries. It is an impediment because the realization of these objectives depends, in the final analysis, on our ability to assist the people to achieve the will and technological know-how to resolve their own problems and do the job necessary to bridge several hundred years of history, to modernize their economic, social, and political institutions for participation in the twentieth century world. Stimulating this will and providing the know-how is the great challenge confronting the people responsible for the selection and training of foreign nationals in the United States; but, from this writer's experience, the problems which tend to reduce results of this great potential catalyst of change are extremely serious.

Problems in Planning the Training

The initial step in the process of sending civil servants to the United States is the identification of training needs and objectives by the American advisor and his counterpart⁵

⁴ *Participant Training Operations: Statistical Report and Analysis*. International Cooperation Administration Bulletin (July 1958 to March 1959).

⁵ The American advisors function in a counterpart relationship with their equal members in the host government. Thus, a budget advisor would have a counterpart relationship with the host country's Director of the Budget.

within the framework of planned or going substantive projects.⁶

Training, in any context, requires effective planning to achieve optimum results. In cross-cultural training, it assumes an even more important role, because the pre-planning of the training provides an opportunity for communication that is indispensable to true agreement between the advisor and counterpart.

True agreement, rather than superficial assent, is the objective of the planning phase. The counterpart and advisor must study and agree on the organization's personnel and operational weaknesses within the context of broader organizational programs. They must agree in identifying the positions, functions, and skills required to achieve their program objectives.

Effective planning in Vietnam was most often the exception rather than the rule. The main reason for this was the lack of understanding, and the misinterpretation, of the training by the advisor and his counterpart. Because the training concept is a relatively new one, the advisor must energetically and skillfully exercise the key role during the planning phase, which is directed at achieving basic agreements. Unfortunately, the advisors often viewed training as an independent program activity, rather than a tool available to them in performing their substantive mission. Often, also, the advisors were too preoccupied with immediate problems in their area of responsibility to spend time planning for future effects through trained people. (Training, by its nature, is a long-range activity and most advisors are in the country for two years only.) Finally, in some cases, the advisors considered bilateral planning unnecessary, either because they felt that it was more expeditious to plan independently, or because they did not recognize the need for planning at all.

An example of the problems developing from the absence of basic agreements during the planning phase is the institutionalization of the French word "bourse" in connection

⁶ The I.C.A. and the contractual groups plan and allocate funds by each particular project. Within a specific project, funds are allocated for training of nationals for that program. Projects may be in the area of public works, banking reform, police administration, or in-service training. The project agreements, including training plans, are mutually agreed to by the American advisors and the local officials.

with cross-cultural training activities in Vietnam. "Bourse" means scholarship, and its usage (and misleading connotation) has been perpetuated by officials who do not understand the concept of training as a tool for achieving program objectives. Consequently, grants for the training of civil servants have been, and are, conceived by many as a scholarship program to send worthy civil servants abroad for a year of study, independent of any substantive program.

More specifically, inadequate or unilateral planning manifested itself throughout each subsequent step of the training program cycle and, most important, in attenuated results in the substantive area for which the training was given. While in individual cases excellent results were achieved through training, in a great number of instances people were trained in non-priority areas. In other cases, the wrong people were trained. In still others, trained people were not utilized. Another outgrowth of inadequate planning was unrealistic budgetary allocations for training. Funds budgeted on the basis of planning that did not represent basic agreement resulted in excessive allocation because of the mistaken value of wanting to err in excess rather than in shortage. Excessively large appropriations lead either to lost money (training funds that might have been used elsewhere) or to the psychology of wanting to spend money that is available, whether or not the spending is warranted. Either one, of course, reduces the potential value of the training.

Who Is to Be Trained?

Following the planning phase, the candidates are selected by the advisor and his counterpart after mutual consideration of the trainee's educational experience, interests, needs of the agency involved, and the training to be received. A serious problem often arose at this point that requires examination.

The advisor, by virtue of the social complex he represented, often considered ability to learn and efficiency to be the primary criteria in awarding training grants. However, the counterpart, reflecting his cultural background and environment, often had different standards for judging worthiness. When selection was left entirely to the local officials—as it was

in several cases—age, formal education, and political acceptability proved to be prime determinants. Many of the societies sending trainees, Vietnam included, are patriarchal in nature and place a high value on age. Responsibility and authority are not often given to young people, no matter how competent. Formal education is viewed as mandatory, since the civil service system in Vietnam, again as in many of the developing countries, is based on a scheme of personal rather than position classification, and a person can occupy only positions determined by his rank which, in turn, is determined by level of formal education, and not necessarily ability. Also, Vietnam, as with many of the societies sending trainees, places a high value on fidelity to the government, making political acceptability a necessary criterion in selecting candidates.

The implications of this extend beyond the selection of trainees and the period of study to their eventual return and impact upon the programs under which they were trained. When trainees were selected solely on the basis of ability and potential, reflecting the values of the advisors, they generally performed better during their period of training than the trainees who reflected the values of the counterparts. However, if success in this problem-centered type of cross-cultural training is measured, as it must be, by the contribution to the advancement of the substantive programs, then trainees who generally had the poorer learning experience but reflected the values of the counterparts were more successful.

This is so because an evolving society, by its nature, tends to be restrictive and cautious in allowing new ideas a means of expression. The opportunity to utilize what has been learned is reserved for those with prestige and status in the governmental hierarchy. The roots of this prestige and status in Vietnam lie, in most cases, in age, formal education, and political acceptability. Our concept of the "bright young man," the person easiest to work with in the United States and often best capable of learning, often proves to be the one least likely to be effective upon his return, because he lacks the necessary prerequisites to gain a position from which he can implement his new knowledge.

In advance of basic civil service reform and changing administrative values which will seek and reward competence, attempts must be made to find candidates who combine the two sets of values. This can be done by selecting candidates with demonstrated ability and potential for development from within the accepted social order—those who can return and have effect, those who command the indispensable prestige and respect. When candidates with the desired combination of characteristics are unavailable, we must be prepared to sacrifice ability and potential for the vital strategic social and professional placement, without seeking to impose our values.

Preparation for Training

The period after selection and prior to departure is used for English training, cultural and social orientation, and the introduction of aspects of the substantive area in which the trainee will study. The objectives of this pre-training are to minimize adjustment problems and to insure maximum learning. The effectiveness of the pre-training will directly influence the value of the training period itself.

To be effective, the pre-training period must: (1) provide adequate English preparation prior to departure so that four to six weeks in an English-speaking environment will be sufficient to produce a degree of competence which will permit maximum learning; and (2) provide an awareness and expectation of finding things professionally and ecologically different, and to inculcate a willingness to accept, if not like, the differences and to learn by comparison.

This phase of the program in Vietnam did not often receive adequate attention and, consequently, sufficient preparation was not often given to the trainee. The results of the failure were manifold: one-fourth to one-half of the year's training time used by a large number of trainees to bring their English up to the minimum level required for comprehension and learning; a number of lingering cultural adjustment problems, extending far beyond the reasonably expected acclimation period; and the excessive amount of time used by trainees to acquire basic fundamentals in the training area, which should have, and could have, more easily been learned at home.

The causes of the failure were different in each of the pre-training areas. Training in English was a problem because of inadequate teaching facilities, lack of trained teachers, and insufficient research into the teaching of English to speakers of non-European languages. In addition, the three to eight months between selection and departure could not be expected to produce fluency in English, even under ideal conditions. At best, it could provide a sound foundation which would allow the trainee to become fluent in the shortest possible time upon arrival in an English-speaking country.

General cultural orientation was ineffective because of the tendency to oversimplify the task by forgetting that we were not dealing with completely malleable individuals but, rather, individuals seeing us and interpreting our words and actions through individual and national stereotypes and prejudices. Orientation material must be prepared with an awareness of the predispositions and prejudices of the audience. This was not always done in the past, largely because of the absence of basic psychological, sociological, and anthropological data about the country, which prevented the adaptation of orientation material to the specific society. It is relatively simple to say that America is a constitutional democracy with a federal form of government, but what do these words mean to a Vietnamese who has lived his entire life under an imperialistic government?

Substantive preparation was very often overlooked because the trainee was assumed to have more background in his field of study than he actually did. Prior knowledge of most areas of study was inadequate to allow the trainee to enter an American classroom on the same level as his classmates.

The problems of pre-training are given added dimension by the time limitation imposed by the immediacy of the need for trained technicians and administrators.

The Training Program

The advisor, counterpart, and trainee should agree upon the program of study to best prepare the trainee for his future position in the organization. The home office in the United States, which is responsible for programming the trainee, translates the general recommen-

dations of the advisor into specific program activities.⁷

General recommendations which were unilaterally conceived by the advisor, or which attempted to fit trainees into standardized training patterns consisting of academic, workshop,⁸ or observation training, resulted in the exposure of the trainees to learning experiences which were not best designed to fill their, or the organization's, needs.

Even when the training recommendations accurately reflected the needs of the organization as seen by the advisor and his counterpart, the training experience often did not produce the desired learning. This was so because academic, workshop, and observational training have inherent limitations as they were used in this type of cross-cultural education.

Factors tending to limit the value of academic training for the six- to twelve-month trainee from Vietnam were these:

1. Trainees often lacked sufficient competence in English to comprehend adequately in an academic situation.
2. The lack of familiarity with our philosophy of education, which is much different from what most trainees from Vietnam are accustomed to, made learning difficult.
3. The problem of locating the proper type and level of course work for the trainee was also difficult. Individual subjects in a college, especially in highly technical areas, are fully significant only as part of a course sequence, which the six- to twelve-month trainee did not have time to develop.
4. Trainees were older than their classmates and often felt uncomfortable as a result.

⁷ In the case of the Michigan State University Group, the programming office in the United States was the Vietnam Project Office on campus in East Lansing, Michigan. Most trainees sponsored by the I.C.A. have their training arranged and coordinated by I.C.A./Washington.

⁸ Workshop training is a promising and increasingly used technique in training civil servants from developing countries by giving them the opportunity to exchange information with people having similar backgrounds and problems. Their interaction with new ideas is the desired means for acquiring new knowledge. The functioning of trainees from underdeveloped countries in a group learning situation requires additional study before conclusive judgments can be made.

Due to these problems, the foreign trainee in the academic complex has invited special privileges and rules. He has frequently been excused from taking final examinations, has been allowed a large number of absences, and has not been required to be given a course grade. While reducing certain tensions, the special privileges have also detracted from the amount of control that could effectively be exercised over the trainee by the office administering the program. It has also removed an obvious stimulus to study and work hard.

On-the-job training, or the observational phase of the program, was conceived to allow the trainee to see theory put into practice, and to encourage his learning by comparison. In a small number of cases, it gave the trainee the opportunity to learn by doing. The observation period usually occupied between 20 and 30 per cent of the total program time and consisted of visits lasting less than five working days.

The steady stream of requests for public and private organizations to provide on-the-job training has run the cost up for them in dollars and valuable staff time. The welcome mat is wearing out and trainees who are accepted generally receive packaged types of programs with minor modifications. The programs which are arranged for them are focused primarily on discussions between trainees and staff members, with the staff member expounding on his technical specialty for several hours and then answering such questions as may be raised.

On-the-job training centered around discussion must be suspect as a training experience. In order for discussion to be of great value, certain variables must be present in the trainee. English competency is the first prerequisite and, as we have seen, was often lacking in the trainee. Second, he should have a knowledge of the topic under discussion, so that the staff member can share his experiences as a practitioner of theory, rather than lecture on basic fundamentals. Finally, there must be a willingness to ask questions and press for complete understanding. Often trainees were unable to pursue ideas because they did not wish to admit their lack of knowledge. Others felt it impolite not to have understood.

The result was that the potential value of

the on-the-job training phase was seriously reduced because the trainee was unprepared to benefit from the experience provided.

The entire experience must also be considered from the point of view of transferability. Assuming that the trainee were able to handle and absorb the material presented in the discussions, which are usually based on descriptions of operating procedures, the likelihood of the experience undergoing the necessary change to make it applicable to the home culture and needs is small. Two widely accepted principles of transfer of learning were overlooked by the on-the-job training. First, transfer is most likely to take place when the learning situation closely resembles the conditions in which the learning is to be applied. Second, general principles are more easily transferable than specific facts and skills. Discussion-centered on-the-job training most often did not satisfy these requirements.

Post-Training Re-integration

Following the completion of the training, the trainee theoretically returns to the agreed upon position, where he has continuing contacts with the advisors in his work.

Unfortunately, in Vietnam there were many problems in achieving effective absorption of the trainees into the working complex, even when the planning and selection phases were properly executed. In many cases, new knowledge was suspect and the returning trainee was put in a position where he could not use his training. In other cases, rigidities in civil service procedures did not permit the trainee to resume his former position, much less receive a promotion. Some trainees created their own problems by returning with an inflated idea of the value and scope of their newly acquired knowledge or of themselves, and thereby became estranged socially, culturally, or politically. Many trainees, too, while gaining technical knowledge, proved to be insensitive to the problem of effecting change in their society and attempted to make radical changes in a short period of time. Finally, unpredictable problems, such as changing leadership of the agency, altered the relationship of the trainee to his superiors.

Each of these difficulties attenuated, to a degree, the results of the training period. However, some of the problems might have

been avoided if the advisor had maintained continuing contacts with the administrative supervisor of the trainee during the period of training. Too often the advisors considered their responsibility for the trainees terminated with their departure. The preparation for their return must begin immediately after departure and be pursued until the end of the training.

Conclusions

The number and scope of the problems which arose in the different phases of the cross-cultural training of a group of public administrators from Vietnam indicate the complexity of the program rather than an indictment of it. The direct and indirect benefits, which are many and varied, that have accrued from the program have not been considered. However, there are such strong indications of the value of the training that they more than justify its continuation and improvement.

In conclusion, I would like to make several recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the training program.

1. Present political and economic knowledge about the nations from which trainees come should be supplemented by additional research into their sociological environments. Particularly, research should be focused on identification of group values, national prejudices and images of the United States, Americans, and American-educated nationals. With this information, training programs compatible with a given environment can be conceived and obvious mistakes avoided.

2. More attention should be given to making advisors going overseas aware of the tool available to them. They should respect and understand the potential contribution of cross-cultural training to their broader program objectives. This might be accomplished by briefing, but more effectively by having advisors work with trainees from the country to which they are going, several months prior to departure. Both parties would benefit, since basically their interests are the same: to effect change.

3. Enlarge the number of people in the United States responsible for programming trainees. There should be at least one person with experience in each country from which trainees come, because each country's trainees

have problems, values, and needs peculiar to them.

4. Publicize the program in the United States so that the private and public organizations called upon to assist in the training of civil servants will understand the program, its problems and objectives. Seminars should be held for the people in public and private organizations working with trainees. Advice and guidance should be given to them on how to hold down costs and maximize the value of the experience to the trainee. This could be done by lengthening the visits, reducing the number of discussions, and requiring trainees to engage in going projects. Emphasis should not be on work techniques, but rather on inculcating an approach toward problem solving.

5. The selection process must be sharpened by giving attention to the establishment of objective criteria that will permit a more rational selection of trainees. The selection procedures might include steps to insure that the people selected have the following characteristics: (a) The ability to learn, including a high degree of retention and the capacity to transfer or apply what has been learned; (b) Emotional stability; (c) Strategic social, political, or professional placement.

6. More attention should be given to developing English and other pre-training materials. Techniques and materials for English teaching, general orientation, and substantive preparation should be developed specifically for this purpose.

Brains Without Mind: An Imbalance

... Most men whose judgment I respect take plenty of time on major problems and make time if possible. They do not decide until it is necessary to do so. They "think it over" carefully but not necessarily logically. What I have tried to emphasize is the insufficiency of logical processes for many purposes and conditions and the desirability of their development in intelligent coordination with the non-logical, the intuitional, even the inspirational processes, which manifest mental energy and enthusiasm. This is by no means easy. To rely upon "feeling," to give weight to first impressions, to reject logical conclusions and meticulous analysis in favor of an embracing sense of the whole, involves an inconsistency of attitudes. It means developing the artistic principle in the use of the mind, attaining proportion between speed and caution, between broad outlines and fineness of detail, between solidity and flexibility. As in other arts, the perfection of subsidiary techniques and their effective combination both require constant practice. . . .

One can hardly contemplate the passing scene of civilized society without a sense that the need of balanced minds is real and that a superlative task is how socially to make mind more effective. That the increasing complexity of society and the elaboration of technique and organization now necessary will more and more require capacity for rigorous reasoning seems evident; but it is a superstructure necessitating a better use of the non-logical mind to support it. "Brains" without "minds" seem a futile unbalance. The inconsistencies of method and purpose and the misunderstandings between large groups which increasing specialization engenders need the corrective of the feeling mind that senses the end result, the net balance, the interest of the all and of the spirit that perceiving the concrete parts encompasses also the intangibles of the whole.

—CHESTER I. BARNARD, *The Functions of the Executive* (Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 322.

Reviews of Books and Documents

Metropology: Folklore and Field Research

By CHARLES R. ADRIAN, Michigan State University

METROPOLITAN CHALLENGE, by John C. Bolens and others. *Metropolitan Community Studies, Inc.*, 1959. Pp. 301. \$3.00.

METROPOLITAN ACTION: A Six-County Inventory of Practical Programs, by New York Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan Areas Study. *Joint Legislative Committee on Metropolitan Areas Study*, 1960. Pp. 141.

PLANNING AND THE URBAN COMMUNITY, Harvey S. Perloff, ed. *University of Pittsburgh Press*, 1961. Pp. 235. \$4.00.

THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA: A Metropolis in Perspective, by Mel Scott. *University of California Press*, 1959. Pp. 333. \$12.50.

1400 GOVERNMENTS: The Political Economy of the New York Metropolitan Region, by Robert C. Wood. *Harvard University Press*, 1961. Pp. 267. \$5.75.

METROPOLOGY, as the minions of Henry Luce should by now have dubbed the study of metropolitan areas, is an infantile disorder among the social sciences. Its victims are deep in the agonies that were experienced by political science a generation ago when that field was torn between those who thought that students of government should be practitioners of reforms and those who took the word "science" seriously. Related to these agonies is the fact that academic municipal reformers of some years back drew their programs largely from the goals of a segment of the business community that wanted to apply "business principles" to local government. They did not seek to expand the horizons of knowledge by empirical examination of the assumptions of the business leaders. Similarly, much metropology since 1945 has dealt with efforts to propagandize on behalf of efficiency and economy goals. In neither period of ur-

ban history—before or after 1945—has the problem of local democracy been the central focus of the participating academics. Significantly, the municipal reformers and the students of "metropolitan area problems" also have had in common a working relationship with businessmen who are "civic leaders." Although the urban planners—members of a profession—are accustomed to working with such persons, social scientists—members of academia—have not been. This has been especially true of political scientists. The others who study metropology—the economists perhaps excepted—have only a bit more experience and probably no more acceptance by the business community.

So an alliance was formed between those who had money and believed they had problems—the business leaders—and those who craved social recognition and its pecuniary perquisites—the planners and professors. It is not surprising that this alliance produced in the years before and just after World War II "studies" and "reports" that for the most part emphasized the absence of long-range, metropolitan-wide planning, that counted the number of fire departments in an area, and deplored "unnecessary" duplications of services. A generation after Pearl Harbor had signalled the beginning of the nth urbanization movement in the United States, the shelves of city hall offices were groaning with moth-eaten and mildewed reports—reports that were not acceptable to the political decision makers because they were unacceptable to their constituents. It was not just that those who had financed and conducted the studies had sometimes mistakenly assumed that their truths were self-evident; a more serious cause of rejection centered in their almost total lack of concern with the political process and the probable ignorance of their authors of the fact that a democratic public is a "satisficing"

public and not one concerned with optimum economy.

As the 1960's began, some evidence was to be found that a second generation of metropolitan-area studies was about to be launched and that—though the foundations doing the financing had not quite caught up—some people were engaged in "countercyclical thinking" of the sort that might improve our understanding of the metropolis. There was still a great deal of money being poured into metropolitan research, and the political and economic anxieties that rapid urban growth had produced were still extant. Indeed, the Census of 1960 had added to the demands for bigger and better metropolitan-area studies. The reasons that this was so are quite obvious.

Established Assumptions of Metropolitan-Area Studies

Many men who are regarded as "civic leaders" in America's larger cities began reaching for the panic button last year. They were joined by the municipal "pros"—city managers, chamber of commerce secretaries, mayors, and local civic-research directors. The alarm, of course, resulted from a good look at the 1960 census figures. These showed that an impressively large number of our metropolitan core cities had gained little or had actually lost population in the preceding decade. Former residents had retreated to the suburbs. Community newcomers of the middle classes—the now-famous "organization men"—had scarcely glanced at the central-city areas as they scurried to the suburbs looking for housing. The population losses in the huge core cities caught practically no one off guard. New York lost nearly one-quarter million people, Detroit took a 10 per cent cut, but no one was very surprised. It was in the smaller core cities—those under 200,000 population—where the shockers took place. Leaders in many of these areas thought their cities were gaining population nicely—they had local estimates to "prove" it. But dozens of Altoonas and Muskegons now find themselves in the same mold with the largest core cities—they have not gained; many have lost population. These findings need not have been unnerving to the local boosters. But they were.

The indignant cries of disbelief, the calls for immediate annexations, the demands for

recounts, all stem from the fact that the 1960 census documents a trend that stomps underfoot in cruel fashion some of the dearest values of civic boosters and of some students of metropology. It is difficult for them to accept the trend as a normal part of the growth of a mobile population based on an industrial society. The folklore that many civic leaders have taken to be gospel does not permit them to accept "the trend of social and economic forces" as an explanation. Many of the leaders who formulate and guide the policies of our larger communities hold to beliefs that are based on a whole series of unrealistic assumptions about how metropolitan areas can and should be governed. Collectively, these assumptions represent the folklore that determines in large part the policy statements found in the reports of Chamber of Commerce committees, "citizens' committees" on metropolitan-area problems, and local government research bureaus. There were a spate of metropolitan-area studies after the results of the 1950 census became known. Now 1960 should spur defenders of the community image on to even greater efforts. They will be seeking "solutions" to the "metropolitan problem." They will call for studies, as they did after 1950, and they will expect them to rest upon the following generally accepted assumptions.

Core-City Expansion

There is the belief that the core city of a metropolitan area must "expand or die"—the notion is widespread that there is no such thing as prosperous stability for a community. The idea is that central cities become socially and economically obsolescent faster if they have no expansion space within their boundaries. It assumes that the entire metropolitan area must grow and that the core city must grow at a near-equal rate—growth being measured by population. The argument is a favorite of local persons who have a financial stake in expansion—editors, chamber of commerce staff members, downtown merchants, city managers—and also serves to placate businessmen's anxieties concerning a tax base, or tax advantages to businesses beyond the municipal limits. The policy demands of this municipal application of the geo-politician's *lebensraum* theory usually take the form of plans

for annexation of all of the urbanized hinterland, or of the creation of some kind of an "upper-tier" metropolitan-wide government.

The concept of growth is probably a product of our American culture which developed from the frontier where population growth was invariably associated with "progress"—progress against the Indians and forest, and in favor of Western civilization. It overlooks the fact that the real challenge in municipal policy today is to get away from the ringworm approach to urbanization—decay at the center and new growth at the periphery. It underestimates the need for finding socially useful functions for the older parts of town—as Europeans have done with considerable success in their much older cities. It represents an effort to flee social responsibility by taking over new lands rather than saving what we already have—a policy that was appropriate on the frontier, but not in a maturing America. It also represents a desire on the part of civic leaders and professionals to expand their policy controls as the area grows. These people are especially concerned about commercial development patterns. (A new suburban shopping center, particularly if it is financed from outside the area, can spell doom to central business district profits and to community fiscal control by local bankers.)

Efficiency and Economy Highest Goals

There is the belief that *efficiency and economy* are the highest political values held by the American homeowner. Leaders of metropolitan-area studies are likely to assume that efficiency of administration and economy in budgeting are the things that would be most preferred by residents—if only "politicians" didn't get in their way with selfish desires to preserve jobs and personal empires. Those who make this assumption sometimes exclaim in wonder and horror, "Why, there are seventy-six different fire departments in the metropolitan area!" But to the suburbanite, who wants a voice in policies that affect his place of residence, this may spell "good" rather than "bad."

Those dedicated to efficiency and economy seem never to consider that the suburban merchant or homeowner may value other things higher—in particular, *access to decision-making centers* and *representativeness* of local

government. (One can certainly read this preference into the findings of Bollens *et al.* and Wood.) The suburban merchant wants local policies that will maximize his profits and minimize his competition. He probably sees his own suburban government as more likely to do this than would the core-city or some metropolitan government. To him, any super-government is likely to voice the values and business goals of the downtown merchants and large landowners. As a result of that feeling, the small fringe-area merchant, who frequently operates near the edge of financial disaster, is an advocate of grass-roots Jacksonianism. So is the suburban homeowner, who wants to have a hand in determining many things: service levels in the amenities provided by local government (according to what he thinks he can afford), land-use policies which he thinks will affect his property values, the kinds of neighbors he will have, and educational policies that will help determine the job and status opportunities of his children.

Efficiency and economy are probably among the suburbanites' lesser concerns—to him other things have a far higher priority. This attitude is in accord with a traditional view of Americans. We do not like to pay taxes and we do not associate taxes with services. Because this is the case, efficiency and economy arguments are nearly meaningless—the typical citizen probably does not see an important relationship between the way in which services are provided and the size of his own tax bill. He, rather cynically, expects government to be relatively inefficient. And since, to him, it is going to be inefficient come reformer or professional administrator, he wants a voice in local government. He wants to be able to reach the decision makers when he has a problem. He has a different concept of democracy from that of the advocate of efficiency and economy who seeks deemphasis of the popular decision-making process and who has always demonstrated an anti-grass-roots prejudice.

Greater Suburban Political Interest

There is the belief that suburbanites are more likely to know their officials personally, to vote in larger percentages, and to attend more public meetings than do their core-city

neighbors. Even core-city leaders often accept these myths as facts and consider the core city's supposed deficiencies in these respects as problems that must be overcome before appeals for metropolitan consolidation can be effective. But we now have enough accumulated evidence to know that none of these assumptions is correct (see Bollens). The suburbanite's psychological satisfactions seem to come instead from (1) having officials who share his values and life style, and (2) the knowledge that access to governmental officials is available to the citizen when it is needed—an emergency resource, not a pleasure to be nibbled as a daily habit.

Acceptance of Area-Wide Planning

There is the belief that the public is prepared to accept area-wide planning if a politically feasible way can be found to administer it. There is no question but that long-range, integrated planning of land-use and capital developments would offer certain advantages to the residents of today's metropolitan areas. No question, either, but that the ghettoization of suburbs costs heavily in terms of depriving many persons—of lower income or lower status ethnic categories—of housing of the kind our culture considers decent. Or that restrictive suburban land-use rules drive up the price of housing unnecessarily. Or that land is often used unsystematically and wastefully when its urban development is left to profit-motivated realtors. Or that people pay many times what they might have paid for municipal capital improvements by refusing to plan ahead (Perloff, Scott, Wood). Yet suburbanites do not support area-wide planning. Indeed, they are often hostile to it. They will cooperate with planners if there is a program—perhaps a new sewage disposal plant—that can most easily be financed by joint suburban-core city action (New York inventory and others). But basically the suburbanite, in a strife-torn world, sees his home and its local government as a refuge from conflict, as Wood neatly pointed out in his earlier *Suburbia*. A place in *Vertigo Heights* represents a retreat to the womb. There, in secure isolation among those who live, work, believe, and act as he does, he seeks a school plant that symbolizes his status in society and a school curriculum that meets his style of life and the expecta-

tions he has for his children. He wants his friends and neighbors to make land-use policies for him, for only they, he believes, can be trusted to mold the suburb to fit the die he and his neighbors have cast. He wants the planners to prevent the development of ethnic, class, status, or value conflicts by keeping out those who do not fit the established pattern. Effective metropolitan land-use controls, potentially, would do violence to one of the main purposes—whether for good or evil—of independent suburbs.

The Professional Administrator Over the Amateur

There is the belief that professional administration—which the core city has and a metropolitan-area government would have—is preferable to amateur administration. Preferable to whom? To many, no doubt. But the typical citizen is ambivalent in his attitude. He wants a government of friends and neighbors, but he wants one that will deliver pure water to his tap. He often prefers amateurs to professionals—as in the case of the suburban volunteer fire department which he finds far cheaper than the core city professional system designed to protect (at considerable cost) warehouses, apartment buildings, and high-rise business structures. Amateur fire fighters provide enough service to meet his demands—and a little glamour rubs off on them in the process. He is not so sure, either, about professionals in welfare, health, and even sewage disposal.

Above all, the suburbanite appears to prefer doing business with the amateur or semi-pro rather than with an anonymous bureaucratic professional in a city hall miles from his home or business and dedicated to professional principles and goals which he does not share or even understand.

Metropolitan-Area Government Is More Economical

There is the belief that a metropolitan-area super-government would save the taxpayers some money. This idea probably stems from the notion that such a government would be more efficient. In fact, however, although we could undoubtedly get a better return on our tax dollars than we do, we could not save enough money by this method to make more than a slight dent in today's huge municipal budgets. And as for economy, the prospects

are dim, and for good reason. Metropolitan governments would almost certainly seek—over the long pull—to raise service levels. They would demand bigger and better streets, street lights, public health services, school plants, engineering standards in subdivision development, and the like. Furthermore, they would probably be able to raise levels at a faster rate than would be the case in a balkanized metropolitan area. This is so because citizens would probably say, "All right, we voted this thing in—now let's see it solve my sewage-disposal (storm water, street surfacing, school finance, etc.) problem!" Also, metropolitan-area government would encourage a move toward the use of more genuinely professional administrators and these men would strive toward the optimum service levels established by their particular professions, whether in public health, highways, civil engineering, or whatever. These programs would almost certainly exceed in cost any savings the professionals could accumulate through greater "efficiency." Then, too, the service levels they would be raising would be chiefly in the relatively low-density suburban areas—and the large lots of suburbia run up the cost of many services—of curb and gutter, sewers, water supply, and fire protection, for example. These demands would also raise per capita costs for the core-city property owners (unless everything were done by special assessments), for the suburban areas in most cases not only have greater needs, but have lower assessed valuation per capita than does the core city.

Distinctions Exist Between Local and Area-Wide Government Functions

There is the belief that a rational distinction can be made between functions that are strictly local (suburban and core city) and those that are appropriate for area-wide super-government. Plans which seek to divide responsibilities between "lower tier" and "upper tier" (metropolitan-wide) governments nearly always conclude by making virtually all significant functions metropolitan. When this happens, the efforts being made to secure change are dissipated before they are fairly under way, for they lose nearly all of their potential support in the suburbs. There is no method by which to distinguish local and metropolitan functions that would satisfy both

professional administrators and suburban citizens. An arbitrary approach is necessary and the only one that is likely to be at all successful is one that transfers to the metropolitan government only those functions that involve problems of widespread urgency throughout the area, where consensus holds that no other workable solution can be found.

A Metropolitan Point of View

There is the belief that a metropolitan area is a monolithic interest—a single community—that stands, or should stand, against the world, as do the wheat farmers or the oil producers. Civic leaders talk of a need to present "the metro point-of-view" to the legislature or Congress. But is there a metropolitan point-of-view? A metropolis is a great collection of people who, for economic and other reasons, live in close geographic proximity. They are each active in the pursuit of a livelihood, of recreation, of social activities. Each wants to pay no more of the social cost of the metropolis than he must. To him, there is a water supply problem, or a school curriculum problem, no doubt. There is a Mad River interest. But is there a Dayton "metro" interest? There is a Westchester interest. But is there a New York "metro" interest? The answer is "yes" to professional urban planners, civil and sanitary engineers, social workers but not to the typical citizen. His own concerns make his views parochial. To him, the only realistic metropolitan-area policies will be those that recognize and accept—however unwillingly—that parochialism.

There is the closely related view that a metropolitan area, if "properly" organized in a "modern" fashion, would operate smoothly and with no more conflict than, say, that in an eighteenth century New England town. There seems to be a widespread idea among civic actionists that the procrastination, name-calling, and general confusion that characterizes decision making in metropolitan areas is a result of decentralized government and is in part artificially created by job-seeking politicians. A harmonic metropolitan "public interest" is often portrayed in study reports as a reality to be striven for. Actually, however, a metropolitan area is a maze of conflicting values, goals, activities, and ethnic subcultures. The governing body of a unified metro-

politan area would contain as many different pressures and cross-pressures as are found in a state legislature, and its operations probably would be no more harmonious. A "metro" government would be strife-torn and its major decisions would be produced in agony. It might encourage better coordinated policies; it would not diminish conflict.

The New Generation of Metropolitan Researchers

The second research generation may now be beginning to merge. We find some new perspectives and analytical techniques in the Bollens study of the Dayton area and the Wood study of New York. The planners in the Perloff and Scott studies are still in large degree philosopher-kings ("Shouldn't we look for ways of bringing our greatest architectural and artistic achievements into the center of the city where more people can see them more frequently—isn't it time, in other words, that the CBD became the Central Business *Plus Cultural District?*"). But they are willing not only to recognize the short-range and unprofessional outlook of the citizen, but even to concede the legitimacy of his claims to be heard in a democracy.

Metropolitan Challenge

The Bollens group conducted a study of the Dayton, Ohio metropolitan area, with considerable help from the Ford Foundation. The report is different from many of its ancestors in a number of respects. It begins by asserting that a basic prerequisite to an understanding of the metropolis is "a knowledge of individuals as social beings who interact with each other," and throughout this thought is given more than lip service. The economics of the study (as in the case of Wood also) is the economics of academia rather than that of many a chamber of commerce secretary who holds that "you can do anything you want to in this community so long as you think positively." The principal innovation is a serious effort to find out what the people of Dayton and its two rings of suburbs think about metropolitan-area problems, what their concerns are, and how committed they are to action on perceived problems. (It was learned, incidentally, that less than one-half of the people in either Dayton or the suburbs had

even heard that a "metropolitan-area study" was going on, despite widespread publicity for the activities of the group.)

Wisely, Bollens and his crew did not include the usual tired, warmed-over recommendations. Indeed, they included no recommendations at all, which limits *Metropolitan Challenge* to a collection of interrelated facts. The omission of "next steps" and of analysis in terms of action makes sense, especially because the data do not in themselves indicate which lines of action are to be followed. But the decision makers who will presumably make use of this report could have been helped greatly had there been some speculation concerning the meaning of what remains a great lump of only slightly digested data. In particular, some tentative efforts toward a theory of metropolitan political behavior could have been attempted from the attitude study. Perhaps we cannot expect the new generation to reach full maturity in but a few studies' time, however.

Practical Approaches

Metropolitan Action claims to be nothing more than an inventory, which is exactly what it is. The members of the joint legislative committee provide here a convenient summary of *ad hoc* metropolitan arrangements in six New York counties outside the Gotham area. They call them "practical approaches," for that is how the elective officeholder regards the squeaking-wheel, or politically safe, approach to service dissatisfactions. Some excellent illustrative material demonstrating the utility of "satisficing" and its rich variety may be found in this modest report.

Metropolitan Politics and Planning Organization

The Perloff volume contains an often rewarding collection of essays which were read before a seminar sponsored jointly by the Carnegie Institute of Technology and the University of Pittsburgh. Part I deals with the nature of the urban community and Part III with the planning process and planning education. In the central part, three papers are related directly to the subject of this essay-review, for they deal with the relationship of metropolitan politics to planning organization. Frederick Gutheim offers the opinion that a metropolitan government is not necessary for

effective planning in a metropolitan region because a valid plan "must be reckoned with in the decision-making process" no matter how the process is structured. This unconventional view is promptly stomped on by James W. Knox and J. Steele Gow, Jr., using conventional arguments. Most of those commenting on the subject favor a metropolitan-wide government, and many appear to consider it an essential. But James A. Norton, a political scientist, backstops Gutheim by suggesting that planners should begin to accept multiple local governments in metropolitan areas as "givens" in a political system that can be modified about as easily as can the topography of the region. As in other of the essays, questions are not settled, but at least they are raised and new perspectives are often presented.

Many different words are used in this volume to describe the component parts of the decision-making process. The most important part, apparently, is the one that, in one phrase or another, deals with putting the selected alternative into effect. The discussion periods following each essay presentation are not lacking in the plaintive appeal: "Granted the desirability of what you have outlined . . . how do we move from the present situation to the one you propose?" Not surprisingly, the answer is never given with the specificity that the practitioner would prefer.

San Francisco Bay Area

One is tempted to say that the outstanding thing about the Mel Scott volume is its magnificent photographs, but that would not really be fair. Scott, in earlier writings, has demonstrated that he combines keen training in the planning profession with a sensitivity for the complexities of the processes of democracy. The same characteristics reappear here, reinforced by a taste for history and an ability to present it in a most effective fashion. The history of the Bay area from the perspective of the planner is fascinating. As Scott gets nearer the present, however, we emerge from nostalgia and reverie as he presents the usual list of problems—they exist in the San Francisco-Oakland area as they exist elsewhere.

Scott's fundamental assumption is that metropolitan-wide government should exist be-

cause it is the only effective means of implementing the planner's ethic—he gives Gutheim little aid and comfort. A happy land with an excellent industrial base and beautiful residential areas for all is foreseen, but only if a government exists that has the necessary sanctions to force the pieces together. Still, Scott concludes that "The record of attempted cooperation among the cities and counties of the Bay Area raises almost as much doubt as it does hope concerning the possibility of metropolitan government." Quite unconsciously, it would seem, the author in his historical summary points out why this should be so, just as Robert Wood does for the New York area (Wood, pp. 189-90): "quality has improved for almost every service in every part of the Region. On a per person, constant dollar basis, more money has been put to public purposes at a faster rate [between 1947 and 1957] than in any other ten-year period in the Region's history." Scott bemoans the fact that "Although most professional planners and many of the planning commissioners in the Bay Area recognize the need for metropolitan regional planning, most citizens appear to be intent on solving local problems. . . ." While he sees the need for acceptance of the democratic process and compromise with the short-sighted laity, he does not give a hint of recognition of the fact that the metropolitan government that leads to future happiness must somehow be structured so as to preserve for the ordinary citizen his esteemed sense of access to the decision makers.

Political Economy in New York

Wood probably has the most to say of all those being reviewed here, though his style of writing forces one to read almost every word from the beginning of the book to the end in order to discover that this is the case. And it is the case despite the fact that his major methodological innovation—the application of factor analysis in an attempt to relate community characteristics to spending patterns—almost comes a cropper. All he learns from it is that the one significant factor of the seven he works with is community size—the most important item in determining the size of municipal expenditures is the number of persons and the amount of property a community services. This comes as considerably

less than a shock, but perhaps we learn something by discovering that the other six factors (clusters of characteristics) are quite insignificant.

A few of the major points resulting from Wood's research as part of a larger study done for the Regional Plan Association by the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard University under the direction of Raymond Vernon, are the following:

(1) Both local and regional (metropolitan) governments tend to follow the economic pattern rather than to lead it. Governmental innovations that complement the decisions of the market place are likely to succeed; others are not. "The most stringent of land-use control or the most ardent wooing of industries will not in the end determine the broad pattern of settlement."

(2) The evidence indicates that, in the New York area at least, local and regional governments will in the future be able to finance municipal services at at least the present levels with little or no redistribution of the gross national product, and "the resilience of public revenue does not seem as low as is often supposed."

(3) "Slow evolution over the next twenty-five years, not decisive action to alter the main lines of development, seems the course of least resistance." And that is the course the political leader nearly always seeks to find in the absence of overwhelming pressure to do otherwise—pressure that does not exist in the New York area and is not likely to exist in the next generation.

Future Trends and More Profitable Lines of Inquiry

So from the beginnings of a second generation of research in metropology, we see some indicators for the future and for further inquiry—lines of investigation that should be more profitable than were the old activities which had the effect of reenforcing the folklore.

Rate of Growth of Local Expenditures

Governments in metropolitan areas—always granting isolated exceptions—will not face grave financial crises. There will be the conventional and occasionally frenetic protests as taxes are increased. Interest rates on local

government bonds will probably increase because the demands for money will grow faster than will the size of the high-income group that has traditionally purchased "municipals." We need to learn if local expenditures in areas other than New York are not also likely to grow at about or only slightly above the rate of growth of the economy, and if roughly the same is not true of local revenues.

Local Revenue Capacities

The commonplace, fear-filled statements of future costs seem to result in large part from projecting current standards of services and current population trends, but assuming an almost unchanged gross national product. Past assumptions seem to have sorely underestimated local revenue-raising capacities. It is also quite possible that the sharp increase in local government debt in recent years is a matter primarily of convenience rather than of desperation—millage increases can be avoided, or rather disguised, by the use of revenue bonds paid off by special assessments and service charges, and the public prefers this to pay-as-you-go. (Cynics will say "you mean the politicians prefer this." Perhaps empirical study will show that both do, and questions such as these are quite easily investigated.)

Area-Wide Planning

Regional planning activities will continue to expand, but they are not likely to enjoy the compulsory sanctions of government in the future much more than they have in the past. Planners will continue to find the non-planning public stubbornly paying far more for roads, parks, sewers, water supply sources, schools, and other physical facilities than would be necessary because citizens will continue to discount the future at what planners consider a frightful rate. There is room for serious doubt if this habit would change much under the coordinated blandishments of a super-government for each metropolitan area. Planners will probably continue to be frustrated by their inability to get the public to support more efficient uses of land. And there is the matter of decay at the core of each metropolitan area and of jerry-built shacks, slums, and "illogical" mixed land uses on the fringe. A little empirical investigation will probably show that these characteristics of American

cities would not be eliminated by structural changes in metropolitan-area government because the source of them lies not in the structure of government, but in the culture. The fact probably is that Americans don't much give a damn—or at least they don't give enough of a damn to spend the money that would be necessary or to submit to the discipline and controls that would be needed to change the pattern. (Banfield and Grodzins, in *Government and Housing*, have demonstrated that there is no economic reason why America should have *any* slums.) The planner may argue that his job, then, is to make Americans want to give a damn. He is free to try, but there is no accounting for tastes, and no predicting of changes in them. The graveyards of the nation abound in able men who sought to impose their values upon the community.

Federal and State Aid

The problems that are most acute in metropolitan areas are and will continue to be tempered by both administrative and financial assistance from the state and federal levels. In many cases, the trend simply reflects what Americans seem in any case to want, in others it would seem that not even the largest conception of a metropolitan-area government would serve adequately—state or federal action is necessary. This is probably true in the case of highways, and of the prevention of water pollution. Some potential inequities (culturally defined) are being avoided by the use of higher levels of government—levels that probably seem no further away from the ordinary citizen than would a metropolitan super-government. Differing local educational finance capacities are being reduced, for example, not by metropolitan school districts controlled by a distant bureaucracy, but by modifications in state-aid formulas. The inequities are not disappearing overnight, but that is the way of democracy. In other functional areas, too, the decision already seems to have been made and a commitment given to the use of state and federal aids, and sometimes of the single purpose special district. In light of the continuing unpopularity of metropolitan super-government proposals, we might inquire further into the expanded use of grants and shared taxes as a substitute. Such an alternative could preserve the grass-roots

government citizens clearly prefer. What the ultimate costs would be in terms of loss of local control and local sense of responsibility is a matter for investigation; past studies have usually assumed, without inquiry, that this is the road to the end of local self-government. Would it be a more direct route than metropolitan-wide government?

Needs and Service Levels

The spine-chilling tales of a monstrous and expanding gap between existing service levels and "needs" could use some investigation. Without doubt, many individual communities within metropolitan areas fall short of standards that a cross-section of the public would consider acceptable. Privies in suburban slums threaten the public health. So do polluted streams. The marriage rate will climb sharply in a few years and this, we may safely predict, will be followed by new cases of overcrowdings in schools. Snails are able to keep up with the rush-hour traffic on some expressways, today. And so it goes. But in this connection we must remember at least two things that are often overlooked almost totally in metropolitan-area studies. In the first place, most of the needs and problems that are discussed in the routine reports are not *abnormal* crisis situations, but are a part of the ordinary problems of urban living in a wealthy, changing, complex nation. It is true that, though ordinary, they are difficult. So are many other of man's problems. Second, metropolitan area "shortages" exist in considerable part because they are defined in terms of the standards of the professionals in the various fields and we may be sure that these are standards we can never catch, for they disappear before us like gossamer on an autumn wind. Both Scott and Wood (as well as many earlier studies) show how very much service standards have advanced over the years. They will probably continue to advance, both as defined by the ordinary citizen and by the professional. Each generation has its own definition of minimum, adequate, and optimum standards. The reports of professionals will always show "grave and alarming inadequacies."

This estimate of trends and possibilities is not written by Pollyanna. The future will be filled with problems, as was the past. Metro-

politan living will become the normal thing for Americans and it will be complicated, for that is the way of the metropolis. One of the great and urgent problems—how many metropolitan-area problem inventories have been issued without a mention of it?—will be to find ways for many ethnic and racial groups to live simultaneously in harmony and close physical proximity. The expansion of national wealth may not, in the future, equal or exceed that of the population, as is here being assumed. Increased demands for funds to fight the Cold War may diminish the resources available for the continued meeting of metropolitan service demands in the easygoing, in-

efficient, expensive way that we have in the past. But this seems unlikely. Our biggest problem in the end—given America's commitment to democracy—may be that of preventing the ordinary metropolitanite from developing a sense of alienation from the local political process. If our goal is to preserve the institutions of democracy, the burden of proof is on those who would take away the little governments (or give them nothing to decide, which amounts to the same thing). For all their faults, little governments almost certainly, in comparison with all other governments, maximize the ordinary citizen's sense of participation—and they do continue to muddle through.

Groping in Group Theory

By SAM KRISLOV, Michigan State University

SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, A Study of Leadership, by Sidney Verba. Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. 273. \$6.00.

THE remarkable contributions of small group theory and research have certainly been among the highly significant developments of the past few decades in the social sciences. Group theory generally has brought us new data as well as new interpretations of existing data, it has drawn allegiance from leading practitioners in many fields, and the social sciences have been both fructified and refreshed by this drawing together of differing academic areas.

Today, however, this development has slowed. The momentum has been arrested and there are indications of serious stock-taking with regard to the group approach to the social sciences. It is still profitable to retell with a flourish the successes of small group research, to document the brilliant findings of Muzafer Sherif on the group-involved basis of perception, and to tell anew the dramatic story of the findings of the Hawthorne studies. It is fascinating to recall vignettes of William Foote Whyte's *Street Corner Society* and to recapture the delight of Newcomb's Bennington girls' discovery of liberalism. Indeed, in itself

the recounting of all these and other triumphs of group analysis which constitute the core of Verba's new book requires considerable discipline and learning. It is quite impressive to see how much can be assembled on this general topic, and the book conveys both fascination and excitement. Verba's book is a demonstration of how far-reaching the implications of such a compendium can be, and it is a packed panoramic view of these successes. The summaries are disciplined, tight, informative, and enriched by a subtle commentary.

The book, however, is not a random summary of all such research. It is an attempt to interpret the specific utility of small group theory and research for the study of politics and, in this larger sense only, for public administration as well. The author summarizes three broad aspects of facets of small group research and suggests that these have particular relevance for the study of politics and power.

First, he reviews laboratory and simulated studies demonstrating the intrinsic importance of the small group matrix of society for psychological well-being and for the development of general attitudes. Students of political behavior and administrative techniques must obviously take into account the small groups and their processes and influence.

This section of the book is distinguished by a sophistication not always prevalent among writers in the area. Verba is as aware of the limitations of group theory as the meanest critic and is constantly reminding us of these limitations. Is the German family the breeder of authoritarianism? Verba reminds us that descriptions of French family life are not remarkably different in tone or allocation of power from those of the German family. Is the work group the basic unit of the factory? Verba reminds us that face-to-face interaction is conditioned by the total structure of the institution which permits, facilitates, or inhibits such face-to-face contact. Are political attitudes mainly a product of family environment? Verba reminds us that in the Soviet Union adults are careful to conceal their real political opinions from their progeny less there be inadvertent revelation to the authorities on the part of naive children. Is the difference between a traditional society and a modern industrial society one of the existence of face-to-face groups versus the prevalence of large numbers of complex institutions? Verba reminds us that all societies depend upon both types; it is simply the frequency and the complexity that is the major distinctiveness of the modern society.

Again and again, he warns us of the problems of transferability of studies from the laboratory to concrete life relationships. Experimental small group studies tell us a good deal about certain types of human behavior; but this behavior is the untranslated laboratory behavior of an unselect group, nonrepresentative as a general rule, with different motivations from the usual population. Before such studies can have real application for social science, they must be reinterpreted through "field" experiments which come much closer to simulating the actual conditions under which most behavior takes place. Sherif's camp studies and Gosnell's voting studies are commended by Verba as the type of such "real life" experiments he would regard as desirable.

Leadership Studies

Next, Verba turns to the phenomena of leadership in both informal and formal groups and summarizes the chief findings of research in this area. By introducing "formal"

group studies he introduces a discordant note that is never eliminated nor harmonized. He is particularly taken by Bales' and Slater's studies which essentially dichotomize the leadership function into an exterior task-oriented dimension and an interior social leadership function. (Verba regards the phenomena of leadership as virtually indistinguishable from power.) Here his major contribution is a highly suggestive footnote criticizing such theoretical efforts as Simon's analysis of power allocation. These two dimensions, Verba suggests, are often focused on different individuals, and both of these dimensions must coincide before power may be exercised. A single factor analysis of power (usually a simple correlation) will, as a rule, lead to unimpressive results statistically. The fact that power analyses have not revealed much of significance, he suggests, might well be due to an inadequate perception of the duality of the leadership function.

The third area is clearly the least satisfactory. Here, Verba reviews the Lewin-Lippert studies on "democratic," "laissez-faire," and "authoritarian" styles of leadership and evaluates the results and the lessons we can learn from them. Since Verba is sympathetic to this approach, the weakness of these studies emerges with rather singular clarity, particularly from Verba's rather lame conclusion on their applicability. "There is no one 'best' leadership structure. What structure is best must depend upon the group setting, task, and membership—in short upon the total situation." There is little point in traversing the ground of these "styles of leadership" studies except to point out that they are conceptually weak, ideologically ridden, and subject to all kinds of methodological criticisms which later sophisticated efforts to cure have not completely eradicated. Since the "styles of leadership" identified bear little relationship to actual possible conduct on the part of practical leaders, the result has not been any clear-cut lesson for practitioners in the field, even when reinterpreted in the light of the particular problems at hand. Even this section of the book, however, has a flowing style and one must admire the skill with which Verba moves from summary to criticism, from evaluation to description.

Small Groups and Social Structure

Yet the book breaks down at the crucial aspect when one looks for broader significance. This is not because Verba is unaware of the problem. On the contrary, he is as aware of the wide ramifications of broader social structure as he is immersed in his own materials. He is consistently cognizant of Truman's dictum that the small group theorists who expect to explain the totality of society in small group terms are comparable to the farmer who thought that by lifting a calf each day, he could eventually learn to lift a cow. He constantly reminds us of the impingement of the "superstructure" on the subculture of a small group both in defining the arrangements of the small group and in affecting the values and aspirations within the group. The relative status and power of participating individuals is, after all, altered by the nature of their positions in the superstructure and obviously affects the interaction.

In the same way, Verba is aware of the limitations of laboratory experiments since they eliminate the important variable of the total social pattern. As he is constantly reminding us, there is a need for bridging the gap from the experimental small groups to the real world, from the "ongoing" smaller groups that actually exist—such as the family, work groups, and the like—to the more elaborate superstructure.

It is, therefore, all the more revealing that this awareness avails him very little. At the end of each unit of these three major areas Verba attempts a summary. The significant one comes at the end of the discussion of small groups and the political process. These crucial "building" chapters are disappointing, relatively poorly organized, even approaching evasiveness. The tightness of detail, the subtlety of treatment fade into nebulosity and exhortations. Chapter 4, the important chapter, is titled "Bridging the Gap"; it doesn't.

But it is less than useless, it is obviously unfair, to criticize Verba as an author for not doing what the combined efforts of many thinkers have failed to accomplish over a long period of time. It is not Verba's failure; it is symptomatic of the whole state of the field at the present moment. Indeed the author of this work might well have reversed the usual preface clichés and indicated that though he

had written the book without consulting his colleagues, considering the state of the field, they must assume the blame for the major shortcomings.

Present Problems in Group Theory

It is particularly useful to have a work of synthesis of this kind because it exposes the gaps and the shortcomings that prevail in an entire field; at least those shortcomings are exposed to view in a work of synthesis of this stature. I would venture to suggest that the problem in group theory at the present time lies fundamentally in a basic misunderstanding involving the whole terminology of the group approach. This confusion actually grows by a multiplier effect from field to field; as material is absorbed from social psychology to sociology, to political science, to public administration, the approach becomes increasingly waterlogged with excrescences of terminology and confusion of concepts. In short, everybody talks about groups but virtually nobody is talking about the same thing. And very often the individual writer and thinker is covering up his confusions and his skipping of levels of analysis by utilizing the word "group" in several different senses and defending himself from charges of obvious eclecticism by apparently cloaking the phenomena within the same approach.

Not every collection of phenomena called by the name "group" includes the same phenomena for a social scientist. The assumption that "small groups," "reference groups," and "formal groups" are all basically the same results in considerable confusion.

At its simplest, group theory can be—and often has been—reduced to triviality. It can be utilized to explain, with great and needless precision, that individuals normally react with other individuals and some of these interactions occur with some degree of structure or repetition—"no man is an island"; at least occasionally he must touch at another island.

Equally trivial is the view that a group is identical to any non-monolithic condition within a larger system or part process of some larger interaction. If the term "group" boils down to an assertion that in every interaction of numbers of individuals there would be some people that didn't like others and preferred still others and acted as far as possible

upon this preference, it would hardly be worth the dispatching of the trees that already have been cut down over the problem of group relations—let alone the forests that will eventually disappear.

In this respect the history of the social sciences to date represents an eloquent argument in favor of the development of jargon. The usual criticism of the social sciences, particularly by humanists and practitioners, runs, of course, the other way. But evidence seems to indicate that when a term in the social sciences reaches a point of familiar usage—becomes a workaday word in textbook parlance—it has largely lost its effectiveness as a tool of analysis.

This is particularly the case when the original concept was itself borrowed from popular usage. An example is the term "role playing" which has benefited from its obvious adoption from the field of drama; but it has lost an incisiveness and power of analysis due to multiple uses of the term as Neal Gross and his associates have demonstrated so well.

It is not surprising that the term "group" shares this particular fate. It has enjoyed wide popularity and has been utilized in many fields. But the wide variety of definitions in meanings attached to it has engendered difficulties. Even within the same field these difficulties have not resulted in any agreement on definition. These existent and persistent differences are, though, of vast importance. Thus, the group can be seen either as a construct, an hypothesis having no defined boundary, or it can be viewed as an "existential" operation, a real "entity." Similarly in another dimension group can be defined (either as an entity or a construct) on both the psychological or the social level—in terms of identification or values on the psychological level, for example, as against social activity or concrete membership on the other level. Again, a group may be defined in terms of face-to-face interactions or it may be extended into discussions of complex organizational and social phenomena. (Verba speaks of "ongoing" groups as opposed to more complex social groups.) Finally, a group may be discussed in terms of some "objective" interest largely defined by the observer or in terms of some identification of interest on the part of its own members. (Thus, Marxism "objec-

tively" postulates a social "group" called "class" which others with a psychological orientation feel is an improper definition of social class as actually experienced.)

Healthy Disagreement and Criticism

Results of these disagreements are to be found in many of the recent criticisms of the group concept within the field of political science and public administration. This series of critical articles, it has been suggested, portends disintegration within the field and a new tendency to dismiss group theory. Perhaps this is so; there is a fashion of scholarship as clearly and, all too often, as arbitrary as there is a fashion of women's clothes. But it may very well be that the current discussions and efforts to refine the concept of "group" present not a sign of weakness, but rather of strength, not a portent of failure either permanent or temporary, but rather the product of success.

Barely concealed behind the labels of behaviorism and behavioristic research in political science and public administration lie many dormant disagreements over concepts about the best method of development for these fields. Significant differences exist among those labeled by the term "behaviorist" with regard to the proper mode of future analysis and the methods to be utilized in reconstructing these fields. So long as behaviorism remained an offensive minority, these differences could be hidden behind slogans that emphasized the rejections of existing approaches to the field. Behaviorism versus formalism was a useful banner. Upon achieving a mature standing in the field, however, internal disagreements in this broad approach were bound to come into the open. Like the pregnant cat found by the boy in the street, behaviorism was destined to "fall apart" upon finding a home.

In this view, the recent examination of group theory is closely tied to a desire to utilize the group approach not as a weapon for criticizing opponents but as a tool for accomplishing what has not been done in the past. Once a theory ceases to be a polemical weapon it cries out for refinement. Orthodox Bentleyites have for many years been in a position to say—like orthodox Christians—that the theory had never failed for it had never been tried,

but efforts to apply the approach necessitate the adjustment and close scrutiny of the concept. Typically, past studies resembled Stephen K. Bailey's *Congress Makes a Law* which pays obeisance to Bentley and the group approach in the initial pages but quickly becomes simply an excellently done case study of the legislative process. Studies today are required to show more theoretical refinement and specific testing of that refined theory.

What difference does the definition of a term like "group" make? The simple fact is that the definitional problem represents an ultimate difference in the drift and direction of the field. The discussion over group theory, in short, is largely programmatic. Concealed in the various definitions of the term is a very real dispute between advocates of quite differing models for political science and public administration—whether the field is to base itself on and to imitate the development of psychology, sociology, or physics. The discussion of definitions is a discussion of the way in which the field may go. Important points of difference are glossed over by the pretense that all group studies are equal to all other group studies and that a simple, cumulative sifting and rearrangement of all previous inquiries will lead to some major synthesis and breakthrough in the immediate future.

A Small Group Is a Small Group

Verba is inferentially aware of some of this problem. He identifies his groups as either "experimental" small groups or as "ongoing" groups, a term he explains involving less difficulty than the term "real" groups. He warns us of confusing the two. All of this is true and even good but it avoids the question as to what a "real" group is or what its boundaries are or how one determines the nature of these groups. Similarly, he avoids a second major problem: is it a group because it meets regularly, functions as a group—that is, a sociological definition—or because of the awareness that the members have for each other? Verba uses both elements as necessary for a "small" group but which is the crucial determinant? And why?

Basically, there have been three major solutions to these problems—revolving around the methods of physics, psychology, and sociology. Bentley essentially solves the problem by de-

nial of the existence of any real groups. "Group" is a convenient abstraction developed by the observer to organize social phenomena so as to be able to deal with the complexities of reality. To be sure, the groups that an analyst establishes must have some relation to reality, and the activity being analyzed must actually be taking place. There exist, however, no boundaries in reality, or at any rate their existence is not a requisite for beginning the analysis; perhaps we will find "real" boundaries in the future. The relationship to more complex organizations is more clearly hypothesized, however. The "groups" we call institutions are simply the repositories of past group actions and are ultimately reducible to such group relations. One could unravel these complex structures step by step, peeling off layers like an onion and ultimately getting down to some sort of reducible "group" activity.

It seems apparent that there are certain contradictions between the assumptions of the heuristic nature of groups and the posited conclusion that institutions are ultimately reducible to such relations; but even more significant are the immense complexities of such an operation. Indeed, Bentley's legacy has been to give us ever-more complex and insoluble verbal formulations. (*The Process of Government* is the manifestation of his early approach at a relatively low level of philosophical sophistication.) The problem is not that Bentley ideologically was a semi-Marxist muckraker as we hear so frequently (and certainly not, as has been absurdly and ignorantly argued, a conservative) but rather that he attempted to impose the model of turn-of-the-century physics upon terms derived from his German sociological training, without creating a method by which these terms and the approach could be handled.

In one sense Kurt Lewin also utilized the model of physics; inasmuch as this is explicit in his works it certainly must be taken into account. Yet most of the work done under his influence does not require (nor often is it enlightened by) any of the formulations of field theory as he developed it. Furthermore, the "field theory" that he developed was a psychological one. Only those forces presently identifiable in the mind of the participants are to be taken into account. Most "group dy-

namics" research starts from nontheoretical assumptions on groups and treats them as phenomena having real referents and actual existence in the minds of the participants. Most of the work going under the rubric of small group work has centered around variations on this phenomenon. Discussions of the so-called "primary group" and "job centered group" have also been similar in tone and content although not necessarily informed by the same general theory. Some "job centered" studies do utilize membership criteria—a person is a member of the group if he has to interact with that group. On the other hand, the group dynamics people largely assume that one must have entered into the "field of consciousness" of the other members before a group may be said to have existed. Even here there has been a failure to define sharply and in unmistakable terms which of these two types of definitions is used in connection with the particular study.

And a "Formal Group"?

When one moves up the ladder of social complexity, the "small group" approach tends to dissolve into vapory mist. Verba hints darkly of complex interrelationships with "formal groups"—vaguely defined; presumably they are groups that are not small groups—either ongoing or experimental. What they are and how they are to be identified is never made clear.

In sociological theory there is a tendency to skirt similar problems. One often has occasion to come across "reference groups," which are defined in terms of the psychological attitudes of the members of the groups and then usually treated as equivalent to organized or existing structures. There are certainly problems in defining the reference group in terms of the way in which the individual members perceive the group (or refer themselves relative to the group) and then testing for structural action within a group that is not necessarily coterminous with individual perceptions.

Conversely, many reference group studies often proceed from the other direction as well. Organized groups are treated as realities, and studies are then made of psychological orientations of individual members toward these concrete structures. There is basically nothing illegitimate in either procedure, but it is

dangerous not to be aware of this essential difference.

The sociologist finds the true nature of "groups" to be found not in the personal orientation of the participants but rather in the informality of participation and the lack of well-defined structure with resulting deemphasis of authority and punitiveness. Since the presence or absence of such formality and punitiveness is a relative matter, the sociologist particularly finds himself in a tricky position. The great danger is to move from relatively homogeneous units such as the family all the way to any nongovernmental structure and designate it with the elusive term "group."

The ultimate is reached when one treats organized "letterhead" "pressure" groups as the equivalent of any and all of these other manifestations. Latham's *The Group Theory of Politics* is a particularly revealing example: here, "private governments," labor unions, and corporations are all conceived of as similar in process and nature with intimate living units. Yet, the net impact of the Hawthorne studies and the Wehrmacht findings become meaningless if it is not assumed that there is a difference—a most vital one—between the small intimate association and the larger impersonal patterns.

The consequences are clear not only for the blurring of real issues but also in the creation of false ones. Thus, Fainsod's well-known and brilliant article on Bentley and administration falsely takes him to task for not recognizing the operating influence of institutional patterns, an influence which Bentley has accounted for in terms of his "reductionist" scheme. Truman's *The Governmental Process* attempts to define groups in terms of psychological reference and then treats the problems of large-scale organizations superimposed with Bentley's scheme, resulting in all kinds of methodological difficulties. The interest group approach to the judiciary is "criticized" by another writer who notes that what is involved is not the pressure group in the popular sense—as indeed the original authors in their treatment of interest groups have intended to suggest.

By skipping levels, by utilizing vague portmanteau definitions and by treating all group approaches as fungible, group theory achieved

some of its present impressive status—and reached a cul-de-sac. There is an impressiveness to the broad literature on group development, but it is not truly a literature illuminated by a single approach and purpose as appears on the surface.

Only by an intelligent and careful redefinition of the field, by more accurate distinctions between some of the findings and the spinning off of the different approaches will further progress be made. By careful defining what a "small group" is and is not, by refusing to lump all other social phenomena into such categorical crudities as "formal groups,"

we can begin to unravel systematically the relationship between these various types of phenomena—face-to-face groups, psychological group identifications, complex associational groups, compulsory organizations, and other phenomena. Whether or not we will wish to organize these manifestations under the same term "group" will be a matter of utility and style; but the distinctions between them will have to be made to prevent the tendency for the "group" concept to have the resilience and consistency of an olio. It is time—and Verba's book unmistakably points this up—for group theorists to re-group!

Controlling the Academic Centrifuge

By DANIEL W. WOOD, Assistant to President, University of Delaware

GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, by John J. Corson. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960. Pp. 210. \$5.50.

GOVERNANCE of *Colleges and Universities* is one of the Carnegie Series in American Education. It takes its place beside earlier studies of graduate education, junior colleges, and the American high school. It is a much needed and valuable addition to the literature about a somewhat neglected aspect of higher education.

The big problems confronting American higher education (too many students, too few qualified faculty, and too few dollars) have been well advertised. But there is a less appreciated problem which may prove equally troublesome and in the long run more difficult to resolve. As higher education becomes evermore vital to our national safety and economic well-being and increasingly expensive, our national leaders, taxpayers, and benefactors are going to insist that our institutions of higher learning become more efficiently operated and "governed."

When relatively few were going to college, higher education's efficiency didn't much matter. Now, there is an urgency for improvement that altogether too few within higher education recognize. If the necessary improvements do not come from *within* our colleges and universities, the great danger is that re-

forms will be imposed by groups *outside* of higher learning. The trend is suggested by the inroads state officials have made into the governance of tax-assisted institutions of higher learning via accounting, centralized purchasing, and pre-audit, as exposed by the Milton Eisenhower Committee on Government and Higher Education. Beardsley Ruml's *Memo to the Board*, which recommends that trustees take over curriculum reform from the faculty, is another movement in the same direction.

With this more basic problem in mind, John J. Corson's book is timely reading. A question it will raise in the minds of students of administration is whether our colleges and universities can ever adapt to themselves time-tested principles of management and governance which have brought about efficient, well-run operations in other social enterprises.

Mr. Corson, sometime economist and management consultant, set about the task of acquainting himself with the governance of colleges and universities with a to-be-expected efficiency. One might say he began at the top. He personally examined ten diverse colleges and universities (the author admits these constitute no representative sample of higher education). By reason of his personal acquaintance with many of the leaders of American higher education, Mr. Corson had access to their frank thoughts either through conversation or through correspondence. In addition, the

unusual appendix of comments on his bibliography reveals a broad knowledge of the pertinent literature on higher education.

The book is divided into three broad sections. In the first, the essential complexities and differences which set a college or university apart from other social enterprises are explained. In the second, the roles of each of the major contenders in the governance process (university-wide officers, academic officers, and faculty) are explored in some depth. In the third, the administrative process and the academic climate (i.e. ecology, character, and leadership) and their effect on governance of our colleges and universities are analyzed.

Centrifugal Forces

Imagine a social enterprise with the following characteristics: no agreed-upon chief purpose but a complexity of purposes; employees who each independently feel they know best what is good for the institution, who have no well-defined responsibilities and who have equally strong allegiances to external professional organizations; trustees and over-all officers who are so proscribed by tradition and long-standing delegation of responsibility that their ultimate authority is often unenforceable; outside special interest groups which often can and do dictate important decisions affecting the enterprise; and, apparently, no agreed-upon way to measure the quality of the end product. Such is the condition of the modern university according to John J. Corson.

The complexities of the university as an administrative enterprise are intensified by its persistent poverty. Further, even with the general disintegrating characteristics already mentioned, each institution has further diversities. These are magnified by sponsors of research, private benefactors, church affiliations, and governmental relationships at the state, local, and national levels. Each pulls in a different direction. Corson verifies what John A. Perkins, President of the University of Delaware, has observed: that a university is made up of a number of centrifugal forces, the trick of administration being to keep the enterprise from flying apart. Under such conditions "governance" is understandably complex.

Participants in Governance

It comes as no surprise that there is little agreement as to the actual duties of trustees. Many of their legal responsibilities have been so eroded by time and practice that except for the selection of a president and seeing to the financial solvency of the institution, there evidently is little commonality among the duties of those ultimately responsible for our colleges and universities.

A clearer analysis of how the president of a college or a university spends his time is given by Mr. Corson. But this is not the same as *how he should* spend his time. Nor does it explain completely his role in governance. Studies show, for example, that presidents spend an increasing amount of time fund-raising. If this is so, it may be at the expense of internal leadership. Such a trend may, in the long run, greatly diminish the president's effectiveness as a fund-raiser. Benefactors are more likely to give to a president in whom they have complete confidence as an over-all leader. It also may lead to a decline in the quality of men seeking the presidency. Few top-flight men want to be solely money grubbers.

One would expect that as the span of authority narrows and the functions become more precise, some definitive role in governance might be possible at the dean and departmental levels. The facts garnered by Corson do not support the expectation. The role of the academic dean has always been amorphous. If the president or the department chairman is a strong person or has a decided role in recruitment, faculty evaluation, and student advisement, the dean's role is greatly diminished. Corson's statement that the department chairman is a (if not *the*) key administrative officer does not seem to bear up under the evidence. Chairmen are, for the most part, only part-time administrators, often rotated, sometimes elected, usually viewing problems from the narrow position of their own specialization. They vary from the old-line type, who made the building of a distinguished department their career, to a kind of departmental secretary. If they hold a key position, it does not seem to be in the governance area.

By tradition, custom, by-law, or regulation certain authority in governance has been del-

egated to the faculty as a body. The cliché that faculty should have final authority in educational decisions only further adds to the difficulty in governance, for every decision a college or university makes can be viewed as an educational one. Corson suggests that faculty should *not* have final authority in decision making; otherwise, owing to their conservatism, our colleges and universities would be even slower than they are to respond to the needs of society. Past experience tends to support the author's position. It has been suggested, for example, that if a century ago the issue had been put to the vote of existing faculties, few, if any, would have approved the introduction of the land-grant idea of scientific agriculture, engineering, and home economics into the collegiate curriculum. For another, in Great Britain where the faculties are largely closed, self-governing bodies, there has been an admitted failure on the part of their great universities to adapt themselves to their nation's needs.

Finally, the author examines the ecology and climate of governance in our institutions

of higher learning. He makes it clear that governance is not only a function of place and time but also of personality, character, and institutional quality. It may just be that the stronger the institution in the quality of its faculty and program, the more difficult the governance process.

Fortunately, the author's concern is for the future as well as the present status of governance in our colleges and universities. To this end in each chapter basic questions have been identified which must be resolved if there is to be any great improvement in governance in American higher education. A few examples will suffice: What should be the basic administrative unit? What decisions do faculty have special competence to make? Is the manner of the dean's selection related to his role in governance?

Governance of Colleges and Universities deserves a wide reading both within and outside higher education. It will be especially helpful to those who impatiently question why our colleges and universities cannot immediately become more efficiently governed.

Who, Me?

. . . We are beginning to see that intelligence is a released *capacity to understand* that expresses the free rather than the frustrated associative systems of the individual. In the more important human creative situations it is as a rule not the stupid but the autistic, the paranoid thinker, who, equipped with adequate material, comes perversely to the wrong conclusion. When once the thinker is set free, his intelligence takes on a driving power which overwhelms the obstacles of nature. Experimental studies of the freest types of association—namely, those involved in fantasy—that are already available show that the more serious impediments to effective thought result from self-imposed barriers; for one error due to stupidity there are a dozen due to dispositions within the individual which are essentially protests against the social meaning of the task or against his own relation to it. . . .

—GARDNER MURPHY, *Personality* (Harper, 1947), p. 473.

Developments in Public Administration

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Hardening of the Categories: An Organizational Disease

"If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music he hears, however measured or far away." According to one observer, management is beginning to listen to Thoreau's advice and has "discovered that when individual initiative is continually hemmed in, when group and team pressures determine all the action that is taken in the company, the resulting climate of listlessness, indifference, and apathy can be disastrous to the vigorous progress of the company." (Eugene Raudsepp, "The Shine on the Gray Flannel Suit," 50 *Management Review* 6 (July 1961).)

This seems to be part of a more general call for efforts to foster and develop the creative individuals in government and industry. Applying the usual stereotype, we have visions of government and industry being inundated by the emotionally unstable, sloppy, loose-jointed, bearded Bohemians, listening to a drummer that none of the rest of us can hear. There seems to be some conflict between that vision and the stereotyped view of organization as requiring disciplined acceptance of official objectives, policies, and procedures. If we need the creative person in organizations, as we now seem to be openly saying we do, then it is time to take another look at creativity, the creative process, the creative individual, and the creative environment. We need to get some idea of how measured and far away that drummer is.

Creativity

The term "creative" or "creativity" is one of those terms that moves from level of abstraction to level of abstraction depending on how creative the person is who is employing

the concept. It sometimes refers to the genius, to problem solving, and, even, to the bright ideas that most of us have once in a while. In most attempts to define the term, however, the determining part of the definition is a creation—the production of a novel or unique thing—and creativity is specified as the ability to create that original product.

A great number of definitions come from students who are studying the process of creativity or studying those who are generally considered creative in a special fashion—artists, musicians, etc. The result is that their definitions emphasize that the creative ability is one involving thought and imagination. The psychologist Gardner Murphy, in his book *Personality* (Harper, 1947), defines creativity as the "capacity to produce through thought or imagination."

One interesting change that occurs in the idea of creativity when it moves to the organizational setting is the idea that thought and imagination are not enough. For example, in a volume produced by one of the student study groups of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, creativity is discussed in this way: "Creativity is, in summary, dependent upon three abilities: imagination, initiative and communication. All of them are necessary. Communication has no meaning if you have nothing to communicate, therefore it has to be preceded with imagination. But imagination is of no use if the individual keeps his ideas for himself and does not take the initiative to communicate." (Group 25, Manufacturing Course, Class of 1958, *Individual Creativity and the Corporation*, 1959, p. 17.) Unlike the common view of creativity where the artist's or musician's product is apparently merely produced, creativity in organization requires communicating the product and getting it accepted. A number of other authors imply a similar definition by

including steps in the creative process to obtain organization acceptance of the product. (Deutsch & Shea, Inc., *How to Increase Your Creative Output* (Industrial Relations News, May 1959); Eugene Raudsepp, "How to Make Yourself More Creative," 20 *Management Methods* 38-40 (July 1961); William H. Newman and Charles E. Summer, Jr., *The Process of Management* (Prentice-Hall, 1961).)

Another variation comes from the University of California's Institute of Personality Assessment and Research (IPAR), which has been conducting a Carnegie-supported study of creativity. They have refined the term to the extent of identifying three kinds of creativity: (1) where the creation is clearly an expression of the inner states of the creator; (2) where the creator acts largely to meet externally defined needs and goals and produces a novel product but adds little of himself to the result; and (3) where the product is an expression of the creator and at the same time meets the demands of some external problem. ("Creativity," 9 *Carnegie Corporation of New York Quarterly* 2 (July 1961).)

Producing the Original and the Unique

As the IPAR's kinds of creativity indicate, there is more to creativity than the individual and his inner states; creative thought, imagination, expression, or production do not take place in some internal vacuum. It seems obvious that the creative process involves some kind of transaction between the individual and his environment, although psychologist Morris I. Stein reports that research on creativity has often concentrated unduly on either one or the other. (*Carnegie Quarterly*, p. 6.)

Most of the descriptions of the creative process considered here included roughly the same elements. Of course, there is considerable variation in language and emphasis depending on the field of the person writing. One discussion of the elements by the authors of a management text is illustrative; it follows closely a listing made by Graham Wallis in 1926. According to Newman and Summer, the elements of the creative process are:

1. Saturation—becoming thoroughly familiar with a problem, with its setting, and, more broadly, with activities and ideas akin to the problem.
2. Deliberation—mulling over these ideas, ana-

lyzing them, challenging them, rearranging them, thinking of them from several viewpoints.

3. Incubation—relaxing, turning off the conscious and purposeful search, forgetting the frustrations of unproductive labor, letting the subconscious mind work.

4. Illumination—a bright idea strikes, a bit crazy, perhaps, but new and fresh and full of promise; you sense that it might be the answer.

5. Accommodation—clarifying the idea, seeing whether it fits the requirements of the problem as it did on first thought, reframing, and adapting it, putting it on paper, getting other people's reaction to it. (Newman and Summer, *op. cit.*, p. 280.)

This language would drive the psychologist to distraction and like any attempt to simplify a complex process, some important items are missing. The listing assumes the perception of a problem, for example, when one of the most important facts about creativity is that obvious relationships and obvious problems are overlooked. An individual's view of his world is anchored in or organized around certain aspects of that world which, through a complex procedure, he has come to identify as more significant than others. That the procedure for identifying these aspects of reality is important to creativity is supported by one author discussing creativity in scientists when she indicates that the creative process "involves a scanning and searching through stocks of stored memories. . . . If past experiences have brought about a compartmentalization of the storage areas, so that some portions are partially or wholly inaccessible, obviously the scientist is limited in his search. Compartmentalization of particular areas may result from personal experiences of a sort that lead to neurotic structures generally, or it may result from specific cultural restrictions, such as political or religious indoctrination . . . the more areas that are accessible to conscious and preconscious thought, the better are the prospects for creativity." (Anne Roe, "The Psychology of the Scientist," 134 *Science* 457-58 (August 18, 1961).)

Another part of the creative process that is neglected in this listing of elements of the creative process is some discussion of motivation which puts the process in motion. Clearly, this is one of the most significant aspects of creativity in organization. Dr. C. Guy Suits, Vice President and Director of Research for General Electric, identifies three

reasons for creative activity that are often noted. The real driving force, he says, is an intense curiosity and the excitement of discovery. In addition, he points out later, the relationship between science and human welfare is in itself a source of stimulation, identifying here a service motive. ("Creativity and the Technological Process" in *Recruiting Scientists and Engineers for the United States Civil Service* (Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 29.)

"Rube Goldbergs" Are People?

Several of the selections went into great detail in describing the characteristics of the creative individual. Each attempt was made in the context of a special piece of research or examination of groups of highly creative individuals in special fields. Therefore, this summary profile should not be considered as describing "the creative individual." It should give you some cues in trying to identify persons with a special contribution to make.

Most authors seemed agreed that a minimum level of intelligence was required for creative activity but that above that minimum level, more or less intelligence wasn't crucial. In general, creative people do not appear to be interested in small details, the concrete or the practical. Often instead of perceiving things directly through the senses, they seem to be intuitive-perceivers, perceiving things indirectly where the deeper meanings, implications, and symbolic equivalents of things and ideas are significant to them. Among their basic values the economic rates lowest and the aesthetic and theoretical are high; political, social, and religious values don't seem too important.

Nonconformity in the creative individual is almost a "given," but its pattern of characteristics involves attitudes and ideas and not necessarily nonconformist behavior in the realm of social rules and norms. He is more open to experience within and without, is more autonomous and dynamic, and seems to have fewer authoritarian attitudes. Discipline is necessary to creativity and the creative person knows when to be disciplined and when not to be. He can accept ambiguity and lack of order and is less likely to try to force a solution to a problem but when he has marshalled his forces, the creative person seems to move forcefully and with an air of certainty

to a synthesis that is the original or novel product.

Research on creativity has usually involved the study of special groups of creative individuals, and this raises problems when we try to speak generally about how the creative person relates to other people. There does seem to be some general agreement, however, that the interpersonal relations of creative persons are generally of low intensity. Often they are quiet, ungregarious, somewhat asocial, and dislike interpersonal controversy. They seem to be especially sensitive to interpersonal aggression. On the other hand, this does not mean they are not real human beings. "Creative people are not well-rounded; they have sharp edges," according to one source. (All from *Carnegie Quarterly*; Roe, *op. cit.*)

The act of creating involves hard work to prepare for and refine the "illumination" or sudden insight, and the entire process subjects the individual to nervous wear and tear. According to Gardner Murphy, the individual craving is intense, the intellectual processes are screwed to a pitch that would batter any nervous system, the drive may take the individual out of context with most of his environment, and there is the inevitable frustration of moving toward a goal that is always both near and distant. (Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 467.)

"Constructive Conformity": Can the Organization be a Creative Environment?

More and more managements are coming around to the view that management by direction and control fails to provide the motivation of human effort toward organizational objectives, one author reports. He says, "They understand, of course, that a change in the direction of responsible, constructive nonconformity, self-control, and self-direction cannot be brought about overnight; . . ." (Raudsepp, "The Shine . . .," p. 8.) The terms "responsible, constructive nonconformity," "self-control," and "self-direction" are critical because they point up the crucial question that to "achieve harmonious, united effort of workers in an enterprise, we need genuine acceptance of official objectives, policies, and procedures" and yet "for creativity we want people to challenge existing beliefs and modes of thought freely." (Newman and Summer, *op. cit.*, p. 296.)

It is clear that there are many restrictions on creativity within the organization. One source lists the following as a few blocks: authoritarianism, standardization, specialization, breakdown between thinking and execution, bigness *per se*, in-company traditions, and resistance to change. (Harvard, *op. cit.*, p. 49.) Each of these blocks is a subject in itself that could be explored in depth. It is more valuable, however, to look at some of the things that can be done to make the organization a better creative environment.

The creative person is a part of the environment and reacts to it and while his aim may be theoretical and aesthetic, it doesn't mean he is entirely divorced from the "reality" of utility or application. In fact, most of us are creative to some extent in some aspect of our lives no matter who we are or what we do. It is the response to the creative product—whether it comes from the creative person or from the person being creative—that is significant. It is the response that will determine whether the individual reacts by moving toward helping the organization achieve its goals or whether he reacts negatively and begins to apply his creative efforts in areas that "pay off" more to him.

Management response to the exhibition of creativity must be such that it creates a permissive atmosphere where "people are free to express ideas even though they are at variance with past practices, group norms, or the views of the leaders"; where "supervisors and colleagues give positive encouragement to a person who wants to try something new and different"; and where "mutual respect for individuality runs deep enough so that a person dares to express his creative ideas without worrying about an unfavorable response." (Newman and Summer, *op. cit.*, p. 295.)

Another author lists some actions that private firms are taking to foster and improve creativity: allow as many individuals as practicable to have part in decision making and in the formulation of long-term plans; provide personal recognition for accomplishment, and deliver adequate, concrete rewards; allow more freedom for individuals to guide their own work; encourage interchange of information and opinion among groups and departments, but allow the individual freedom to follow leads that are contrary to group ideas if he feels that his approach furthers organi-

zational objectives better; actively seek out, develop, and encourage those with special talents and aptitudes; lead and inspire by suggestion and indirect persuasion, rather than by specification; provide opportunity for variety of experience, change, and learning, and allow individuals a chance to try their occasional pet ideas without premature prejudicial criticism; and recognize differences in people. (Raudsepp, "The Shine. . . , pp. 8-9.)

It may be that we are entering a period where "creativity" becomes a fad and organizations will collect creative people, like they collect new computer hardware, to show how progressive and intelligent the leadership is. It should be remembered that creativity isn't a universally desirable quality for all organization members under all circumstances. There comes a time in any effort when you must freeze the design and produce; here, then, you may want other qualities than creativity. Surely, the manager can make clear "when and where independent thinking is desired and where and when it is not" without bruising the creative personality. "Clearly, anyone who hopes to be a successful executive had better cultivate any creative ability he might possess. He should at the very least seek to understand what contributes to creativeness in others so that he can help those from whom he hopes to get creative suggestions." (Newman and Summer, *op. cit.*, p. 279.)

Eggheadism: A New Kind of Management

Administrative theory and practice are in the midst of a radical shift toward more concern with people and more concern with numbers, according to Harold J. Leavitt of Carnegie Institute of Technology. ("Changing Theory and Practice of Administration: An Era of 'Eggheadism,'" 24 *Personnel Administration* 7-10 (March-April 1961).) According to him, a new technology—an information technology—is moving in to replace the participative management theory in management education, in research in administration, and in administrative practice. In administrative practice, he says "that its major idea is the idea of information theory; that its tools are new mathematics and the computer; that its practitioners are eggheads . . . and finally that its target is the conversion of the middle and upper management decisions from the

seat-of-the-pants judgments to analytical problem solutions."

The American collegiate school of business is in a state of upheaval, Leavitt says, and the trend is to teach students more about people and more about numbers; to reduce specialization; teach less techniques; teach more behavioral science, statistics, and economics; and, finally, depend more on research to get us the material to teach and less on present business practice.

In research, Leavitt indicates, the same shift is visible as the administrative process "has finally become a subject for research as well as speculation, for description and analysis as well as exhortation." He identifies three main stems of research: concern with behavior of people in organizations, development of quantitative and other analytic techniques for solving heretofore judgmental problems, and investigation of human thinking and problem solving through computer simulation.

"Somebody Goofed"

The Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., room G-3, U.S. Capitol, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

MR. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a little bit of your background and, if you would be so kind, introduce your staff. . . .

MR. [HARLAN] CLEVELAND. My background can be relatively briefly stated. . . . I went to a distinguished institution of learning at the same time that Mr. Frelinghuysen did: Princeton University.

MR. FASCELL. That is a refreshing bit of news.

—Structure and Functions of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, Hearing before the Subcommittee . . . of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 21, 1961, pp. 1-2.

Comment and Critique

Brief letters on *Review* articles and other public administration matters, selected for general interest, stimulating ideas, and thoughtful content. Letters are welcomed by the Editors.

Some Notes on Presthus' "Authority in Organizations"

Robert V. Presthus recently contributed a stimulating paper to this journal concerning authority in organizations.¹ His approach was through four bases of the "legitimation" of formal authority; that is, through four ways of gaining its acceptance by those over whom it is exercised. These bases are: technical expertise; formal role; rapport; and a generalized deference to authority. The paper attempts to illustrate the necessary approach to the components of organization theory if the contemporary application of the "scrubbing brush" (long ago called for by L. D. White) is to create more than froth.

Two serious reservations concerning the paper, however, must be raised. These reservations concern conception and execution. In the first place the discussion in the paper does not raise the concept of authority from comfortable but too-confining analytical ruts. Second, "Authority in Organizations" falls short in its execution in two ways. The author does not do what he says he is going to do and this feature alone requires that the reader be wary, especially if he intends to use the results of the article as a guide for coping with problems in organization. In addition, the paper is a neo-traditional piece which, in effect, neglects the substance of the modern study of organizations. Still worse, it does so while using fragments of the new organizationally-relevant behavioral research to support its argument.

A Limited View of Authority

These two reservations may be fleshed-out by analyzing the paper's purported aim. This aim invites sympathetic reception. "Authority

in Organizations" claims a "transactional" approach; that is, an emphasis upon the interdependence of the informal and formal bases of authority. Thus, "authority" is defined as "the capacity to evoke compliance in others." The goal of the analysis is a "brief, exploratory outline which may be useful in conceptualizing authority in an operating organization."² Clear enough. The paper is purportedly concerned, then, with how behavior is controlled, all the better to study organizations and to get along in them.

Neglects Significant Phenomena

This purported aim, however, is left hanging. The argument goes quite another way. This parting of the ways of argument and aim is more than unfortunate. It neglects many of the phenomena associated with evoking compliance in others, while not appearing to do so. Moreover, the split of argument from aim also encourages a misconception of the nature of organization study. It seemingly avoids just those problems with which the present re-evaluation of organization theory is concerned.

The following tentative model helps support the position just outlined. Consider "authority" to be defined as the "capacity to evoke compliance in others." With no pretense to completeness, many studies demonstrate that compliance sequences in organizations can be understood only by differentiating:

1. *prescribed, or attributed, authority*, which refers to grants from the formal organization;
2. *achieved authority*, which refers to grants from the informal organization, that is,

¹ "Authority in Organizations," 20 *Public Administration Review* 86-91 (Spring 1960).

² This outline is culled from *ibid.*, pp. 86, 87, and 88.

from individuals or from groups in a formal organization;

3. *perceived authority*, which straightforwardly refers to the recognition of grants of types 1 and 2; and

4. *desired*, and *undesired, authority*, which refers to the degree to which individuals emotionally accept 1, 2, and 3.

In addition, complex interactions between these categories exist. Thus, achieved authority may be sanctioned by prescribed authority, as when an informal leader is promoted to supervisor of a work unit which acknowledges his achieved authority. In a similar way, prescribed authority may become recognized as achieved authority.

Consequently, the study of authority involves the analysis of at least sixteen cells of a 4×4 table. The reader may mentally construct such a table. The four rows would differentiate authority as: perceived, unperceived, desired, and undesired. The four columns of the table would refer to authority as: prescribed, achieved, achieved authority which has led to prescribed authority, and prescribed authority which has led to achieved authority. The job of research, then, is to fill in the content of the sixteen cells by investigating such questions as: What happens to output when authority is desired and prescribed?

"Authority in Organizations," in contrast, develops only this conditional statement: If one desires that prescribed authority be accepted (and, perhaps, perceived and desired), these four bases of legitimization will aid the effort.³ Most generously, this restricts attention to four or five of the sixteen cells of the simple model outlined above for studying compliance sequences in organizations. This is a legitimate focus, of course, but it is not the one the paper purports to employ.

Substantial Areas Excluded

This limited focus of "Authority in Organizations" has two important consequences.

³ Thus the paper at one point (p. 86) avows its interest in "formal organizations as systems in which interpersonal relations are structured in terms of the prescribed authority of the actors." This severely limits the focus of the paper, for the general pattern seems to be one of considerable slippage between the formal and informal systems.

First, it truncates the study of authority, excluding such substantial areas as: (1) those into which the formal organization has not been, or cannot be, extended (e.g., satisfactory personal relations at work); (2) those in which the informal organization complements the formal organization (e.g., in contributing to the mental health of employees by providing some degree of control over the work environment); and (3) those in which the informal organization conflicts with the formal organization (e.g., the control of the work environment may be expressed in efforts to restrict output).

As the examples should suggest, there is ample reason to include such areas in the study of authority. Recent work supports this point of view. Traditional organization theory, for example, restricted the study of authority to compliance sequences associated with legitimating prescribed authority. Extricating organization theory from the strait jacket of this restriction has preoccupied much recent thought and research. "Authority in Organizations" tightens some of the loosened straps.⁴

The stakes, however, involve more than "theoretical" matters. Consider this very practical question: What are the conditions under which various styles of leadership are likely to be effective? One could not get very far by concentrating on prescribed authority. Indeed, such a question makes little sense in a strictly formal context. If authority is a formal concept, there is little room for such questions about styles of leadership. This is an unfortunate point of view, for understanding compliance sequences in organizations depends (in part) upon understanding styles of leadership and the wide range of formal and informal properties which vary with changes in style. The interested reader may check the position here by reviewing my summary of what the research literature has to say about leadership styles.⁵

⁴ The difficulties implicit in the character of the argument—which presents a "formal goal-model"—are analyzed in Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis," 5 *Administrative Science Quarterly* 257-78 (September 1960).

⁵ Robert T. Golembiewski, "Three Leadership Styles and Their Uses," 38 *Personnel* 34-45 (July-August 1961).

Theory Types Confused

The second consequence is that the limited focus of "Authority in Organizations" fosters an ambiguity. The paper purports to provide a working basis for the development of an empirical theory, a model of what things are like in organizations under the full range of conditions encountered. The paper, however, actually pursues a goal-based, empirical theory that prescribes the conditions necessary to achieve one set of desired consequences.⁶ The basic proposition of "Authority in Organizations" takes this form: If one desires that prescribed authority be accepted, then. . . . An empirical theory, in contrast, consists of propositions which take the form: A co-varies with B.

The distinction between theory-types is significant. There can be but one comprehensive empirical theory; there may be any number of goal-based, empirical theories. The mixing of the two theory-types has the serious consequence of confusing a goal-based, empirical theory with the empirical theory. The effects on analysis of this confusion have been profound and unfortunate. The practitioner also suffers from the confusion of theory-types. Its practical effect is the unjustified imputation of universality to a particularistic theory which (at best) holds only for a limited range of the compliance sequences observed in organizations. The confusion encourages the shrouding of one's values (upon which a goal-based, empirical theory must be based) in the cloak of a law of nature.

This last point suggests the reason that only one particular goal-based, empirical theory was hazarded in "Authority in Organizations." The article clearly bears the impress of traditional organization theory in the questions it considers relevant for analysis and in the values (even if they are implicit) it seeks to attain.

Empirical and Normative Problems Overlooked

The elements discussed above simply remove "Authority in Organizations" from the context of much recent research. Much more disturbing is the tendency toward self-fulfill-

⁶ This gives the study too much, in fact, for it is studded with presumptions which require, rather than have, empirical support.

ment in the article via the presentation of selected empirical data.

The article's treatment of "legitimation by a generalized deference to authority," for example, demonstrates the point. To provide the necessary background, the paper observes that: "Individual needs for security often result in a generalized deference to authority. Indeed, one is tempted to suggest that the other sources of legitimation are often used as rationalizations for this form of legitimation."⁷ The inspiration for this conclusion is credited to Harry Stack Sullivan, a widely-respected student of man and his emotional problems. For Sullivan, "personality" is the reflection of an individual's characteristic modes of response to authority figures. Anxiety-reduction, according to Sullivan, is the basic mechanism which governs the development of such responses. As he explained: "I believe it fairly safe to say that anybody and everybody devotes much of his lifetime and a great deal of his energy to . . . avoiding more anxiety than he already has, and if possible, to getting rid of some of this anxiety."⁸

"Authority in Organizations," it must be emphasized, is not so empirically and normatively insensitive as to carry this argument to its extreme: that there is some direct correspondence between the level of anxiety and the tendency of individuals to learn deference or to be motivated to activate deference toward formal superiors in an organization. For the article notes that: "It seems reasonable to assume that a certain amount of anxiety is conducive to organizational specialization, while too heavy a load may result in dysfunctional reactions to authority."⁹

Individual Response to Authority

This argument misinterprets Sullivan and overlooks some very difficult empirical and normative problems. Three points will support and explain this criticism. First, the article attributes an unwarranted, if convenient, direction to Sullivan's conclusions about a "generalized deference to authority." Sullivan's notions, however, are directionless. That is, they deal with general mechanisms rather than with their products. Illustratively,

⁷ Presthus, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

sources of anxiety and techniques for anxiety-reduction are defined in the process of what we call an individual's "acculturation." The variations in acculturation can be extreme. For example, agreement about authoritative figures does not characterize even the simplest and smallest "societies." The individual responds to many authoritative cues, and they often impose conflicting demands.¹⁰ Indeed, if there is any one basic finding of the behavioral study of life in organizations, it is this: informal social groups can control behavior more effectively and continuously than the formal structure and sanctions, although this is not to deny the often considerable impact of formal elements. And anxiety-reduction explains this generalized deference to informal authoritative sources as well as it explains deference to formal authoritative sources.

The term "generalized deference to authority," then, is unhappily vague. If "authority" refers to formal *and* informal sources, the term will apply. But it tells us nothing about which authoritative source will prevail under which conditions, a crucial piece of information indeed. In fact, "Authority in Organizations" implicitly uses "authority" to mean only the "formal capacity to evoke compliance." In this case, the use of the term "generalized deference to authority" is purely misleading. Given either meaning of "authority," in sum, the result of the use of the term is to force the discussion of the concept back to the period prior to Chester I. Barnard's discussion of "authority" in his *Functions of the Executive*.

Empirical Limit to Amount of Anxiety

Second, the limit of anxiety to "a certain amount" before "dysfunctional reactions" set in obscures far more than it illuminates. On empirical grounds, the usefulness of degrees of anxiety will be determined (in large part) by the social training of organization members. The accurate prescription of the optimum degree of anxiety for particular individuals requires knowledge of the personality characteristics developed within a "society's" subcultures. This empirical problem does not

¹⁰ The classic experimental demonstration is that of Leon Festinger, "The Role of Group Belongingness in a Voting Situation," 2 *Human Relations* 154-80 (1947).

sufficiently influence "Authority in Organizations."¹¹

More precisely, the general position in the paper neglects much relevant evidence which is contrary to the tenor of the argument. The use of concepts such as "society" must be cautious.¹² However, available evidence (largely restricted to the "American setting") suggests a general social training which develops personality characteristics not well-suited to high levels of anxiety. Thus, the formation of informal groups which support and protect the individual, as by restrictions on output, is a common reaction to high levels of anxiety in organizations.¹³ Moreover, group-centered leadership commonly is more effective in inducing (for example) high productivity than the high-anxiety, directive leadership consistent with traditional organization theory.

Indeed, Sullivan argued that individuals spend much of their time escaping or reducing anxiety. This at least suggests the possibility, consistent with the results mentioned above, that the purposes of the formal organization can be served by reducing the anxiety inherent in organized effort rather than by heightening anxiety by a "certain amount." The act of organizing *per se* seems to imply an anxiety level which often limits the contributions of its members. "Authority in Organizations" does not recognize the point. This is consistent with the traditional theory of organization underlying the paper, but it does not square with substantial evidence to the contrary.¹⁴

Normative Limit to Amount of Anxiety

Third, a crucial normative question independent of these empirical problems is: What degree of anxiety should exist in organiza-

¹¹ "Authority in Organizations" caricatures the "personality" concept as a monolithic structure. See Robert T. Golembiewski, "The Small Group and Public Administration," 19 *Public Administration Review* 155 (Summer 1959).

¹² See, for example, the several subcultures isolated within the "American setting" by Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction Over Revealed Differences," 16 *American Sociological Review* 468-73 (1951).

¹³ See the treatment of similar consequences of high anxiety in the case of the front-line supervisors in Chris Argyris, *What Budgets Mean to People* (Controllenhip Foundation, 1952), especially pp. 18-23.

¹⁴ Much of this literature is analyzed in Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (Harper, 1957).

tions? The observation that, empirically, "too high a load may result in dysfunctional reactions to authority" does not provide an answer. Indeed, this observation implies either that a normative problem does not exist or that "dysfunctional for what?" has an obvious answer.

This is not a debater's point. Very intense anxiety has been employed in organizations to develop and support individuals who complied with formal orders to a very high degree. For example, the administration of the mass murders of the Jews during World War II was preceded and reinforced by a high-anxiety training in obedience to formal authority. One of the more infamous products of this training, SS Colonel Rudolph Hoess, explained his compliance with orders in a way which revealed the degree to which his training had pervaded his total consciousness:

Don't you see, we SS men were not supposed to think about these things; it never occurred to us. . . . We were all so trained to obey orders without even thinking, that the thought of disobeying an order would simply never have occurred to anybody. . . .¹⁵

Hoess could not even perform such simple tasks as multiplication problems, except in a way which reflected his training. After initial failures, Hoess would note with some irritation: "Yes, of course, I had to figure out problems like that all the time—how many days it would take to burn so many corpses, etc."

The normative limits on anxiety, then, cannot be left to the observation of "dysfunctional reactions." Hoess evidenced no such reactions, although (as he complained in his biography) no one really gave him enough credit for the difficult administrative job he performed.

This raises the broader question of the values implicit in the argument of "Authority in Organizations." It need only be noted here that it is dangerous to accept a goal-based, empirical theory without closely investigating the values upon which it is based. Any organizing concept implies a preference for the desirable relations which should exist between men. Normatively, this is too important a matter to let go by default. Empiri-

¹⁵ Quoted in G. M. Gilbert, *The Psychology of Dictatorship* (Ronald, 1950), pp. 248, 255.

cally, it increasingly appears to be the case that the attempt to achieve the values implicit in traditional organization theory tends to curb output, employee satisfaction, and similar important variables.

"Authority in Organizations," unfortunately, fails to be explicit about its values. Moreover, it tends to be less than convincing in the empirical evidence it marshals in support of the implicit value preferences upon which it is based. This is an unhappy combination.

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Long-Range Budgeting and Planning in the Federal Government

More than a year ago, the Jackson Subcommittee of the United States Senate launched a study of our national policy machinery and they began by posing two questions: (1) Can a free society organize its human and material resources to out-think, out-plan, and out-perform totalitarianism? (2) Can a free society organize itself to recognize new problems in the world and in space—and to respond, in time, with new ideas?

Against the backdrop of those basic questions, we, in the federal government, are making a small beginning toward long-range budgeting and planning.

I think it comes down to this: our administrative process does reasonably well in program execution, but it lacks a good deal in anticipating change and reflecting the future in its decision making. Saying it another way, our perspective is narrower than we can afford.

The trouble with the term "planning" is that it raises in the minds of some the specter of a rigid timetable of goals, enforced by the considerable powers of government. None of us is here to argue for that degree of planning. Nevertheless, it was a Republican President who named a commission of private citizens to try to explore what our goals should be, and I think we could agree that this sort of exercise is futile unless we try to understand what stands between us and our

aims, and develop a strategy to move us from where we are to where we want to be.

In our political system, Presidential leadership in a setting of checks and balances is the best response we can make to the challenge of forward planning in an open society. Now comes the question as to the adequacy of the tools available to the President, and one of these is the budget process.

I could understand some skepticism about the neutrality of the budget process as an instrument for looking ahead. There has been so much restraint applied through the budget process that some may wonder if it can now act as a stimulus to administrative flexibility. My answer is that a shovel can be used in either of two ways: to beat someone over the head, or to loosen the earth and let the sun and rain do their work. If you start out with a belief that the government governs best which governs least, and enforce this philosophy with budget ceilings, you may end up justifying the strait jacket theory of budgeting. But if your view is that fiscal policy is the agent rather than the master of public policy, that government should reach decisions from a perspective of needs and resources, and that the budget is a device to weigh choices and develop priorities, then budgeting does become a flexible tool for forward thinking under Presidential leadership.

I recognize that you can look at the future through the eye of the budget and see only as much as you want to see. You can look only for our contingent liabilities and present a story that is full of bad news. On the other hand, you can use your budgetary information to project probable future revenue and spending trends in the light of a growing economy, and show that expenditures can rise substantially within the capabilities of present tax arrangements. Objectivity is the key to what you produce for programming and decision-making purposes.

This year we propose to make a start with the use of budget procedures in the hope that we can anticipate future requirements phased with assumptions regarding economic growth rates and revenues, for a five-year period.

This year we will have a two-stage budget planning procedure. In the first stage, the Budget Bureau has prepared for the President

an informed estimate of revenues and expenditures through fiscal 1966, not for the purpose of freezing budget totals but to enable the President to see from a long perspective the major issues which may arise during this period and which will influence the level and trend of the budget. This stage is completed. I want to be very clear on the point that the long-range look is not for the purpose of "locking up" the budget, but to illuminate the future and make the preparation of the 1963 budget more meaningful.

The second stage will embrace the usual process whereby the agencies prepare their formal 1963 submissions—with much more flexibility than previously—and turn them in to us this fall for final review.

The principal changes, then, from past budgetary practice are these: (1) the figures given to the agencies during the summer were not ceilings but planning guides which could be adjusted without penalty of excommunication; (2) these planning figures came out of a very different process, namely a five-year forward look; and (3) there were no formal, detailed agency submissions this spring, but rather a consideration of trends and issues. It is this kind of material that lends itself to thoughtful reflection by the President, his fiscal advisers, and his Cabinet.

In this transition year, the advance planning exercise is frankly experimental. We recognize that some agencies have a long distance to go before they can gear into the programming process. We realize that some agencies are confused by the change in signals. On the other hand, forward planning is second nature in some agencies and they welcome at last the opportunity to harness their programming operations to the budget process.

In short, we expect to learn from this first exercise considerable about the capability that exists for long-range analysis. We will know more about where we have it and where we need to encourage it. We are not carried away with exuberance in our expectations of first-year results. It may take time before the new system works as it should. We do believe, however, that the requirements of the budget cycle can provide a meaningful stimulus to the development of programming skills so that this type of exercise will not happen

just once a year but will become rooted in management practice.

One thing is certain. All this isn't going to happen just because the Budget provides a climate conducive to it. The real challenge is to the agencies and the people who work in them. If departmental officers do not grasp the implications of Presidential leadership, if budget and fiscal people insist on taking a narrow approach to financial management, if program planners and fiscal officers talk in different tongues and operate from different perspectives, if the agencies do not strive for creativity within their mission assignments—then we are in trouble.

But if, on the other hand, it succeeds in supplying some of the perspective we have been groping for, if it sharpens the contrast among alternative courses of action, if it orients our thinking and decisions toward our opportunities, then we will score a major gain.

In short, we are engaged in testing the ability of the financial management system to rise to the needs of Presidential leadership.

WILLIAM D. CAREY

U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Talk before the Financial Management Roundtable, Washington, D. C.

Inter-City Comparisons

Norton E. Long's review of Sayre and Kaufman's book in *Public Administration Review* (Winter 1961, pp. 23-30) refers to inter-city comparisons in a manner which, we think, may be construed either as palpably in error or omission. We would like to fill in the gap.

Professor Long says in part (concerning inter-city comparisons): ". . . Despite the long history of 1913 and the ICMA we are still largely in the dark as to how to make meaningful comparisons of municipal expenditures. . . . The work of Ridley and Simon stands as a rather lonely monument to the attempt to introduce objective yardsticks. . . ."

We would agree that these quotations should be read in context and what we say is addressed to these sentences in their full context.

The Citizens Budget Commission began,

seven years ago, a study of inter-city cost comparisons. During a period of seven years, we issued seven reports. These have been widely published and copies have been sent to the American Society for Public Administration where they are available for review. We would not presume to evaluate our own pioneering reports, but we welcome examination of them.

More recently, the Municipal Finance Officers Association of the United States and Canada applied to the Ford Foundation for a grant to study inter-city costs and received an amount of money, which was allocated to the Citizens Budget Commission for a pilot study of this subject. We are now engaged in this study. We anticipate that the current study will develop a firm basis for a full-scale attack on the admittedly elusive, complex and confusing puzzle: how can municipal costs be measured?

We have no illusions about the obstacles and have carefully stated them in reports over a period of several years. In fact we considered such an analysis a necessary prelude to an attack on the constructive side of the problem.

In the interest of accurate reporting of the status of this matter, we think you may wish to inform your readers of these facts.

JOHN M. LEAVENS
Executive Director
Citizens Budget Commission, Inc.

Reply to Mr. Leavens

I regret that I have not had the opportunity to examine the inter-city cost comparisons made by the Citizens Budget Commission. It is therefore impossible for me to comment on them. The way in which they overcame the very great difficulties in making these comparisons would have been of the greatest interest. To my knowledge studies undertaken by Professor Robert Wood in the New York Metropolitan Area, John Bollens in the St. Louis Area and James Norton in the Cleveland Area have had varying degrees of success in coping with the problem. I believe Professor Adrian of Michigan State and Professor Oliver Williams of the Fels Institute have given it as searching attention as I know of.

Certainly there are many more whose work escapes my acquaintance.

I know of no scholar who feels happy with his ability to achieve adequate comparability as to the identity of end items and their costs between cities. I take it from Mr. Leavens' letter that the action of the Municipal Finance Officers Association therein referred to would indicate a basic agreement that much needs to be done. I for one applaud the grant of the Ford Foundation and hope that it will bear fruit.

The difficulties with inter-city comparisons stem from two main sources. First we need standardized units and a means of translating actual practices into these standardized units. While in some municipal purchases difficulties are minor, in many there is the greatest difficulty of reaching agreements on how to measure the quantity and quality of service to say nothing of determining its cost. Whether it be schools, fire, police, or hospitals the problem of yardsticks and conversion is baffling. In addition to identifying a measurable homogeneous something purchased and its cost, there is the often perplexing problem of differences between communities as to which level of government pays for or performs all or part of a function. Doubtless these problems are not inherently insuperable and certainly we should and must do everything we can to lick them. Standardized units for the measurement of quantity and quality with respect to municipal activities would be an enormous boon to the administrator and researcher alike. The elusive question of quality of service will always be a stumbling block to rigorous comparisons but one that should not be taken as a crucial obstacle. Much can be done.

While the making of inter-city comparisons is of great importance to the student and practitioner of municipal administration as a source for performance standards, it has a most important and largely untapped value for the student of empirical political theory. The pioneering work of Adrian, Williams and Press, coming in the wake of the community power studies of Hunter, Egger, Ostrom, Dahl and others, suggests a further exploitation of the political subsystem of the municipality as a laboratory permitting empirical field work in the development of sig-

nificant quantifications for theory. Karl Pearson urged us to fasten on the differences that make a difference. Our hope is that these differences are exhibited by gross observables revealing critical variables in the situation. The laboratory of the local political system gives us ready access to these observables and the opportunity to correlate them with significant political outcomes.

A curse of political science has been the persistent temptation to seek unverifiable "wisdom" through the special access of the inside dopester. Unlike the economists who do not seek to explain economic affairs by a special familiarity with bank presidents and the inner workings of the corporate power structure, political scientists have been enamored of an extreme variant of what in economics has had the opprobrious label of institutionalism. Doubtless economics has suffered from the inability of its theorists to integrate the excursion of some of its students into institutional research into its more general theories. But, if this is so, political science has suffered even more through a lack of concern with gross observables other than voting statistics. We need things that can be looked at by a normally intelligent graduate student without special access to the mayor. What are the publicly observable differences that make a difference?

Here is where inter-city comparisons can be highly significant. Like family budgets, municipal budgets should be revealing. If we were to take a roster of cities with differing formal and informal political structures, would we find any grossly observable correlation between the political structure of a city and the end items and the amounts of money it spends on them? Surely, if we accept Lasswell's dictum about politics, money should be a highly significant indicator. If differences in political structure do make a difference, they ought to show up in money terms, in how much is spent for what and who pays for it. Because taxes and budgets are publicly observable gross phenomena, they should have a particular interest for us as providing an opportunity for us without special access or enormous expense to check theory.

Professor Robert Wood's recent study indicating that gross phenomena of population density and income are a better indicator of

municipal expenditures than policy is suggestive of what research can uncover. Certainly, much of our discussion of the comparative merits and consequences of forms of government would be illuminated by determining what, if any, grossly observable differences, monetarily measurable, were correlated with them.

Certainly it is highly desirable that political science should achieve some of the great benefits that have inured to economics from quantification. Study of the subpolitical systems of local government in terms of taxes, expenditures, and their relation to politics offers real opportunity for quantitative work

and comparative government studies of first rate significance. Of even greater importance, this kind of study permits the accumulation of data to check the validity of empirical theory. Perhaps the most significant advance in economic theory was due to the development of statistical series that provided objective data to control theorizing. Similar useful reality checks could be developed through the quantification suggested here, and the municipal laboratory could be the origin of empirical, testable theories of politics.

NORTON E. LONG
Professor of Political Science
Northwestern University

Cart Before the Horse or—No Horse?

'The chief tool of the business executive is his ability to speak and write effectively.' Accepting the truth of this statement, leaders in business and industry have poured money and talent into development of courses and training programs aimed at giving men the skills and techniques necessary to speak and write effectively. But frequently the results of such programs have been disheartening. Why? . . . The people who plan and teach these programs apparently assume that the ability to express an idea is far more difficult than the ability to 'get' an idea. They assume that if a man takes a course emphasizing speech or writing techniques he will automatically communicate well. However, *a man cannot really speak or write well until he has something worthwhile to say.*

We who work with business and professional people as well as college students find that the people who have something to write and speak about, something about which they feel deeply, have little trouble stating their ideas. We also find . . . that original thinking or idea getting comes hard and only after deeper concentration than most people are used to.

—FRED R. DOWLING and A. CONRAD POSZ, "Ideas: The Basis for Effective Communications," 14 *Journal of the American Society of Training Directors* 3 (February 1960).

Editorial Comment

COUNCIL-MANAGER GOVERNMENT: EFFICIENCY FOR GOOD

ONLY seventy years ago, President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard wrote: "all critics of the institutions of the United States during the last fifty years [1841-1891] agree that municipal government has been the field in which the least efficiency for good has been exhibited and the greatest positive evils have developed." Today, critics of our institutions might with confidence conversely declare that municipal government during the last fifty years has exhibited more "efficiency for good" than almost any other institution in the United States.

This is so owing to the spread of council-manager government and the development of the profession of city manager. A city charter proposing council-manager organization was first recommended in 1911 by the Short Ballot Organization for Lockport, New York. A half century later finds 1800 cities so organized. For the first time, 50 per cent of all the municipalities in the United States with populations of 25,000 to 500,000 now have city managers. Since the end of World War II, seventy-five cities and towns each year have adopted this improved form of municipal government. The council-manager plan has had its widest proliferation in some of the home rule states like California, Maine, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia. The slowest growth has been in the New England states and in New York. Unfortunately for municipal administration in these states and some others, council members elected on a partisan ballot buttress the political parties at the State level rather than the idea of professional municipal administrators.

Several factors have contributed to this vast improvement in municipal administration. First, during the past five decades cities have grown greatly. The economy has expanded. Both necessitated adoption of new municipal activities and the expansion of established ones. Necessarily, increased attention has been centered on the need for better organization and

management of city activities. Second, the National Municipal League with its model city charter embodying the council-manager plan and its publicizing of manager plan achievements has helped. Third, the International City Managers' Association, to its great credit, early set forth the City Managers Code of Ethics and propagated it, and a sense of profession, among its members. It established and promoted in-service training programs. Job insecurity, something of a handicap to the profession, has been partially offset by the Association's recent adoption of group retirement and insurance plans. It has educated both the universities and the cities to the mutual advantage of internships and the role of each in such staffing. As a result, the majority of new manager appointments are coming out of university programs in public administration.

Exactly who "invented" the city manager idea, no one now knows. Perhaps he lived in Staunton, Virginia. Perhaps Woodrow Wilson, President, Richard S. Childs, Secretary, or other prime movers of the Short Ballot Organization deserve the credit. The inventor at least reminds us of two thoughts with which we close this salute to the city manager idea: first, efficiency for good requires a basic legal framework that gives professional public administrators a fair chance to perform; second, students of government and administration should not eschew, as is too often done, the role of inventor as beneath or beyond their scholarly duty. In a country where 70 per cent of the people live in cities, and a high proportion of those in the disorganized metropolitan complexes, another governmental discovery with wide appeal might reassure that the progress of the last fifty years will continue in the next.

JOHN A. PERKINS
Editor-in-Chief

Society Perspectives

"OH, GIVE ME A HOME"

OH, give me a home" is a good theme for the generalist in modern American society, including the generalist administrator in the public service. "Generalist" is a good fifty-cent word always worth some reference in a speech, but the listener has to be alert, for it is also a little slippery.

"Generalist" is slippery because the term stretches to include several ideas and a number of situations where general is related to some previously narrow or more specialized state. An operating employee who becomes a supervisor is a specialist who becomes a generalist. He must now perform a number of functions that encompass a more general area. This may also be true of a departmental budget examiner who moves up to the departmental administrator level, say in state government, where his functions are more general than just budgeting.

What we normally have in mind when we use the term in administrative circles, however, is not so much the movement from narrow to general functions. Rather, what we more often think of is an attitude, a way of looking at the world. Thus, when the term is employed, the context in which it is placed must be carefully examined to be certain that the fifty-cent word alone is not the only evidence that the speaker understands the significance of the problem. The movement from employee to supervisor or from budget examiner to departmental administrator may or may not denote movement from specialist to generalist in this use of the word. Whether it does or not depends on whether it is accompanied by a change in the individual where he develops a more general perspective.

If we accept that what we want are generalist administrators with a broad perspective on their work, their agencies, and their role in government and society, it is simple to under-

stand why they are so rare. The question becomes, "How do we obtain administrators who have this broad, general perspective?"

This complex, difficult question can hardly be answered here, but some critical aspects can be mentioned. We can say that the problem involves the effects of prior educational and administrative experience. The emphasis on specialization in training and experience by administrators and personnel departments employing an individual can hardly help but affect the type of person hired and the training and experience individuals believe necessary to their future career. The kinds of requirements established for promotion and advancement and the kinds of training programs available are also important.

More important, perhaps, is the problem of professional self-identification—how the person perceives himself in his capacity as a professional. Until recently, the pressures were strongly in the direction of giving the individual a relatively narrow specialist view. At the federal service level, the idea of an administrative service academy or staff college and the efforts toward a senior civil service oppose these pressures. The presence of an organization like ASPA, dedicated to the development of this generalist public executive with a broad view of his role in government and society, is an important force at all levels of government service opposing these influences.

Finally, it is necessary to fill out in much greater detail the picture of the generalist public executive, if our efforts to produce more of them are to be more conscious and effective. Then, perhaps, the generalist will find a home.

GEOFFREY Y. CORNOG
Staff Editor

You, as a public administrator, have something in common with the agency director in Washington—and the waterworks superintendent in Middletown. You may, someday, have to decide whether electronic computers will pay their way in your office . . . or you'll have to steer a new program between the devil of interest groups and the deep sea of bureaucratic caution . . . or you may wonder what it takes to get the new graduates into public service . . . or how other offices cope with full and fallow work periods . . . or how much sense a standard code of ethics really would make in your area.

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